Multistate Bar Exam

FREE Multistate Bar Questions And Answers

In a brand-new city, a pet shop owner launched a business. She was unaware that a recent ordinance barring the selling of cats and dogs from a retail pet business had been adopted by the city council. The law included a clause allowing pet stores to provide room for non-profit humane societies to adopt pets from pet stores. The owner filed a lawsuit against the city in federal court, alleging a breach of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of equal protection and due process. The statute served a valid state interest and was upheld by the court, according to the rational basis test. The proprietor of the pet shop appealed the verdict. Will the appellate court probably uphold the lower court's judgment?

Yes, because the correct test requires only that the law in question will satisfy any set of facts that could establish a rational basis for achieving legitimate government ends.

No, the pet store owner has a vested constitutional right to earn a living and that is unreasonably precluded by the law in question.

No, because this ordinance is so invidiously discriminatory that it must pass the strict scrutiny test, which it fails to do.

Yes, because the pet store owner was not treated differently than any other pet store owner.

Correct! Wrong!

Explanation:
The rational basis of social and economic regulation is typically examined, and as a result, it is presumed to be valid. Rowe, 320 F.3d 42, 47
(1st Cir. 2003), Kittery Motorcycle, Inc. Under a rational basis review, a law merely needs a minimally plausible set of facts that could demonstrate a
rational connection between the challenged legislation and the legitimate goals of the government. City of East Providence v. Perfect Puppy, Inc., 98 F.
Supp. 2015 Dist. Ct., D. Rhode Island, 3d 408, 419–20. Overpopulation and the brutal treatment of animals, two problems linked to ""puppy mills,"" are
clearly reasonable goals for a government to pursue. 98 F.Supp. Id. at 419.

When she was seven months pregnant, a female executive assistant employee was let go from her job. She filed a Title VII civil rights lawsuit against the company in federal court alleging gender discrimination. The proposed witness had been a vice-president of the company and a close adviser to the president; at trial, she was not permitted to testify that she heard the human relations manager say in an informal meeting that the plaintiff and her predecessor were both fired due to what the manager described as "pregnancy complications." The suggested witness had served as the company's vice-president and a trusted advisor to the president. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the defendant employer without the benefit of such crucial testimony. The plaintiff maintained that the testimony should have been accepted and that it did not qualify as hearsay under federal regulations in the appeal. The court is likely to rule in favor of the appeal and mandate a fresh trial.

Yes, because it was admissible under the "spontaneous utterance" exception to the hearsay rules.

No, because the statement is clearly hearsay with no exception to the hearsay rule being applicable.

No, because it was based on things that the co-worker heard from others, making double-hearsay that is never admissible.

Yes, because that kind of testimony is reliable and not excludable as hearsay.

Correct! Wrong!

Explanation:
A statement submitted against a party and made by the party's agent or servant about an issue within the scope of the agency or employment is not
considered hearsay, according to Rule 801(d)(2)(D). during the duration of the relationship. The case is Zaken v. Boerer, 964 F. (2d Cir. 1992) 2d 1319,
1322–23. These elements give the statement a high level of dependability and tend to favor its admission as a non-hearsay statement. In essence, this
statement was made against the employer's interest by the employer's agent or servant while performing their duties.

A couple who has been living together makes the decision to wed. The guy wants the woman to consent that, in the event of a divorce, all of the property he currently owns will remain in his name. That's something she agrees to, but she wants it in writing. They wed, though, without ever signing anything. The husband leaves the wife for another lady three months later. Due to their prenuptial agreement, he gives her notice that she must leave the house. When she doesn't leave, the husband files a lawsuit and demands that the oral prenuptial agreement be upheld. Will the husband's claim be likely upheld by the court?

No, because a contract in consideration of marriage must be in writing and the prenuptial was therefore not legal as long as it remained oral.

No, because husband did not live up to his promise to put the agreement in writing and therefore he was guilty of fraud.

Yes, because the consideration for the contract was the marriage and the consummation of the marriage made the contract complete and enforceable.

Yes, because prenuptial agreements are given the benefit of the doubt when it comes to enforcement decisions.

Correct! Wrong!

Explanation:
According to most state statutes of fraud, promises made in consideration of marriage must be in writing in order to be enforceable. For instance,
Section 506:2 of the New Hampshire Statute of Frauds mandates that any agreement made in consideration of marriage be put in writing. The
equivalent provision is found in Washington State's 19.36.010 of the Revised Code of Washington. Mercantile National Bank at Dallas v. Lieber,
331 SW 2d at 463–469 (TX Ct. of Civil Appeals, 1960).

A man willingly entered a private medical institution for treatment because he was experiencing emotional distress as a result of marital issues. According to state law, the hospital may keep him for 72 hours if he sought to leave against medical advice while attempting to persuade him to stay. Throughout his stay, he expressed to his medical professionals his tremendous resentment toward his wife, who was cohabitating with another man, and his desire to harm her. The hospital nonetheless gave him an unrestricted weekend pass despite knowing this. He shot and killed his wife after exiting the vehicle. the hospital was sued for negligence by the man's children. Because there was no privity with the dead and no responsibility owed to her, the hospital filed a motion to dismiss. Will the move to dismiss be granted by the court?

Yes, because the intervening acts of third parties are unforeseeable and cannot give rise to liability.

No, because the hospital is strictly liable for releasing patients who it knows or should know represent an unreasonable danger to third persons.

No, because the special relationship and the control between doctor and an in-patient mandates due care by the doctor to prevent a foreseeable danger to others.

Yes, because there is no duty to control the conduct of another person to prevent that person from harming others.

Correct! Wrong!

Explanation:
When a doctor is treating a mentally ill patient by exerting ""control,"" and the doctor knows or should know that the patient is likely to injure others
physically, an independent responsibility arises from that relationship that requires the doctor to take reasonable precautions to stop the harm. See
Bradley Center v. Wessner, 296 SE 2d 693, 250 Ga. 199, 200 (Ga. Supreme Court 1982), as an illustration. Additionally, see Restatement (Second) of
Torts 319, Duty Of Those In Charge Of Person Having Dangerous Propensities: ""One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should
know is likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him
from doing such harm."

At his cattle ranch, where he has a stable of productive, fertile cows, a pet breeder raises calves for sale. The young calves require continual care and attention. When a worker accidentally leaves the fence door open one day, a newborn calf escapes and wanders over to his neighbor's property. In order to ensure the calf's safety and to make sure it wasn't hurt, the breeder went to the neighbor's property to rescue it. But after entering the property, he was taken into custody on a trespassing allegation. The breeder had good attractiveness. Will the accusation be dropped in court?

No, because his status as a breeder made him unqualified for a limited license.

Yes, because he had a limited privilege to enter the land to prevent harm to his chattel.

Yes, because the tender pet doctrine allows temporary entry to retrieve baby animals.

No, because the neighbor had a right to keep any living chattels that crossed onto his land.

Correct! Wrong!

Explanation:
If a person enters another person's land while using a public or private privilege, there is an exception under Restatement 345. According to
Restatement 198, it is permissible to enter to collect chattel that was brought onto the property against the owner's will and over which the owner
has the right of immediate possession. According to Restatement 197, a person is """"authorized to enter or remain on land in the custody of another
if it is or reasonably appears to be essential to avert serious injury to."" ..the performer, or his property or livestock. ..The invader would be categorized
as a licensee in both cases. For more information, see Restatement 345, Walsh v. Sun Oil Co., 437 Pa. 80, 262 A.2d 128 (1970), and Carpenter v. Penn
Central Transp. Co., 409 A. 1979 (Pa. Super. 2d 37).

In one state, both same-sex and opposite-sex couples were given the right to marry under the state constitution. A political organization managed to get a referendum on the ballot, and the majority of voters decided to outlaw same-sex marriage. Any additional rights that same-sex couples may have had under pre-existing state law were unaffected by the proposition. People who were impacted sued the state government for violating the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by illegally taking away their rights and doing so for no justifiable reason. Will the court grant the lawsuit's petitions, nullify the proposition, and restore the ability to marry for same-sex couples?

No, because the people voted to take a provision out of the existing constitution and when that is done by public vote it cannot be altered.

No, because the ballot proposition was properly placed on the ballot and all statutory procedures were followed, thus precluding the courts from taking adverse action.

Yes, under the due process clause no compelling state interest justifies denying same-sex couples the fundamental right to marry.

Yes, because under the Fourth Amendment it would be an illegal interference against the right of privacy guaranteed to everyone.

Correct! Wrong!

Explanation:
A majority of a state's people cannot remove a vested constitutional right. The United States Constitution's 14th Amendment guarantees due process
before the government can take away someone's life, liberty, or property. It also prohibits states from ""enforcing, facilitating, encouraging, or
authorizing such private discrimination,"" which was violated by this referendum by singling out a particular group for unfair treatment and stripping
them of their rights without a legal justification. The Obergefell v. Hodges case, 135 S. Ct. 135, required the aforementioned justification and complete
acknowledgment of the constitutional right of same-sex couples to marry. Ct. 2584 (2015), in which the Court stated that ""couples of the same sex
may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit depriving any
individual of any basic right, including the right to marry. The Supreme Court has officially ruled that same-sex couples have the freedom to marry.
They can no longer be denied this freedom. ”) Id. 135 S. Ct. at 2604-05.

A man created a website where he presented himself as a champion of justice and a superhero with exceptional abilities. He acted as a watchdog, outing bad actors while focusing mostly on consumer issues in his writing. In one of his articles, he profiled a female preacher from a nearby church with no affiliations and just a local blog on the internet. The preacher described the woman's appearance as medieval and said her hair was like a bag of "hot wires ready to electrocute anyone who dares come too close." He claimed she was "conspiring with the devil" to learn "how to lead people's minds astray" and to live a nice "sheltered role of pure moral superiority at the expense of inferiors" like himself and his readers. The pastor was not pleased, and the woman launched a defamation action claiming libel per se and requesting damages along with an injunction against the website. He described the woman's clothing as "medieval" and her hair style as being similar to a bag of "hot wires ready to electrocute anyone who dares come too close." The defendant submitted a dismissal petition. Will the move to dismiss be likely granted by the court?

No, because the preacher's allegations are based on serious factual distortions that will destroy her career if she doesn't get protection.

No, because a defamation action cannot be subject to a motion to dismiss – the plaintiff is always entitled to present evidence to prove the tort.

Yes, because the defendant was expressing opinions more than factual assertions, and opinions in this context are constitutionally protected.

Yes, because statements about religious beliefs or practices cannot be the subject of private defamation actions.

Correct! Wrong!

Explanation:
The concept of constitutionally protected opinion has been developed by the courts. There is no such thing as a false concept, according to Gertz v.
Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974). Take Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc), for instance. rejected, 105 S.Ct. 1127, 471 U.S.
1127. (distinguishing statements of truth from expressions of opinion) 2662, 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985). The idea of constitutionally protected opinion,
according to courts, mandates a review of the """"totality of the circumstances"""" surrounding an alleged defamation. Genesis One Computer Corp. v.
Information Control Corp., 611 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1980). A statement of pure opinion is typically not actionable. Regardless of how hateful or illogical
it may be, it is protected by the First Amendment as is any expression of ideas. Expressions of opinion, whether true or untrue, libelous or not, are
protected by the constitution and cannot be the target of private damage claims. Check out McCabe v. Rattiner, 814 F. 2d 839, 843 (1st Circ. 1987)
(context, first-person narratives, evasive and unsubstantiated claims, and utterances that give rise to opinion rather than reality).

FREE Multistate Bar Questions And Answers

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