Explanation:
A judgment note or mortgage lien given by one joint tenant on his interest in the property does not dissolve the joint tenancy. The second cousin's
right of survivorship became effective upon the passing of the first cousin, making him the sole owner of the estate, in its entirety. Harms v.
Sprague, 105 Ill.2d 215, 222, 224-25, 473 NE 2d 930 (IL Supreme Ct 1984). Due to the legally established survivorship rights, the first cousin's interest
in the real estate expires upon his death. Id. at 224. A judgment does not confer title; rather, it just places a lien on that tenant's interest while he is
still living. The vast majority of courts adhere to this as the current standard today. A commercial lender would not competently loan money and
accept a lien signed by just one of two or more joint tenants, which is another important factor in contemporary practice. This lender would be
regarded as careless and run a serious danger of losing protection.
Explanation:
In general, damages for mental or bodily anguish are not recoverable in cases of contract breach. LinkedIn Corp. v. Low, 900 F. Supp. (Dist. Court,
ND California, 2012) 2d 1010, 1028–29. Additionally, under breach of contract case law, the illegal collecting of a third party's personal information
is not regarded as a """"economic loss"""". See also In re JetBlue Airways Corp., Privacy Litig., 379 F.Supp.2d 299, 327 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (airline's
disclosure of passenger data to third party in violation of airline's privacy policy had no compensable value). In re DoubleClick, Inc., Privacy Litig.,
154 F.Supp.2d 497, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
Explanation:
Laws and statutes that do not directly affect a suspect class or obstruct a basic right are subject to the rational grounds test. Although the right to
work is basic, the right to work as a government or state employee at a certain location is not regarded as a fundamental right. Drug addicts would
not be accorded special treatment or be considered a protected class. See Wadsworth v. State (Supreme Ct of Montana, 1996), 275 Mont. 287, 301,
911 P.2d 1165, 1173. 109 S.Ct. 656; Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, supra. Ct. 1384, 103 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1989).
Explanation:
Trespass is an intentional tort, although there is no need to prove that there was a malicious or trespassing intent. All that is required is evidence of
intent to commit the act that results in the trespass. Trespassing does not require a defendant to personally enter the property; simply causing
something to enter the property is sufficient. So all that is required in this case is the intention to blow the leaves. See County of Harris v. Cypress
Forest Pub. 50 SW 3d 551, 554 (TX Ct of App. 2001). Utility Dist. Trespassing is considered an intentional tort because it entails the desire to do
anything that will infringe a property right or is almost guaranteed to do so, even though the perpetrator may not be aware that what they are
doing would violate that right. Id. Perry v. Cleveland Park Club, 165 A. (Dist of Col. Mun. Ct. of App. 1960) 2d 485, 488-89.
Explanation:
The respective degrees of the plaintiff's and defendant's fault must be established in accordance with the comparative negligence statute in order
to determine if and how much compensation is appropriate. 770 P. 2d 1250, 1259 (Colo. Supreme Court 1989). Lyons v. Nasby. The common-law
notion of negligence per se should not be used to get rid of the legally mandated requirement that a jury determine how much carelessness the
plaintiff and defendant are each responsible for. 94 P. 3d 1271, 1273 (Colo. Ct of App, 1st Div. 2004). McCall v. Meyers. Will the trial court likely
allow the woman's move to bar the man's attempted comparative negligence defense? See Traphagan v. Mid-America Traffic Marking, 555 NW 2d
778, 783 (Neb. Supreme Court 1996).
Explanation:
A non-breaching party to an installment contract may cancel the contract only when a breach or cumulative breaches substantially impair the value
of the entire contract, as stated in U.C.C. Section 2-612. To find a breach, the nonperformance would typically go beyond a small holdup in one
delivery of goods. Additionally, one payment would typically not be enough to prove a violation as time is typically not the substance of the
agreement. H & H Meat Products Co., Inc. v. Laredo Hides Co., Inc., 513 SW 2d 210, 216-217 (1974).
Explanation:
Solo v. Am. Ass'n of Univ. Women, 187 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1158 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (""An evaluation of unconscionability is highly dependent on
context. The doctrine often requires inquiry into the commercial se, small print, and oppressive situation favoring the party with all the bargaining
power"") (""Unconscionability will be found on a thorough examination of all factors that demonstrate a lack of bargaining power, unfair terms,
small print 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 812, 353 P.3d 741 (2015); Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 61 Cal.4th 899, 912. Unreasonably favorable terms for
the more powerful side are what constitute unconscionability. The most important question in every instance is whether the contract's terms are
sufficiently unfair, in light of all relevant facts, for a court to refuse to enforce them. Id. at 912. To assess whether the overall bargain was
unreasonably one-sided, the court considers both the agreement's substantive terms in their entirety as well as the circumstances surrounding
how it was formed. 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1146, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 269, and 311 P.3d 184 (2013); Shamoun & Norman, LLP v. Yarto International Group,
LP, 398 S.W.3d 272, 294 n.23; and Moreno v. Sonic - Calabasas A, Inc.
