"Any moment along the legal procedure, a motion claiming a lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be brought up. The four types of federal subject matter jurisdiction are as follows:
i. The claim must be based on a federal statute or a state statute that poses a significant federal question.
ii. Complete diversity is required (neither plaintiff or defendant may be residents in the same state), and the sum in dispute must be greater than $75,000;
iii. In addition, a state claim may be added to a federal lawsuit if it is based on the same operative fact as the federal claims; and
iv. Legislative: A few acts name particular federal courts as the court with original jurisdiction.
In contrast, the initial answer or first responsive pleading must present an affirmative defense of lack of personal jurisdiction or insufficient service of process.
A person who enters a location that is open to the public or enters a location with the intent of bringing the owner of the location some sort of financial or business gain is said to be an invitee. Owners of premises are required to take reasonable precautions to keep visitors safe from hazards that they are aware of or ought to be aware of. Invitees have a responsibility to reasonably assess the premises for hazardous circumstances.
Given that he visited the property to provide the owner a financial gain, the consumer in the situation at hand is unmistakably an invited guest. As a result, the restaurant had a responsibility to reasonably investigate the premises and to warn of any dangers or make them safe. But in this instance, there is no evidence to suggest that the restaurant acted unreasonable. Only one minute had passed since the incident, therefore it would not have been unusual for the restaurant to have been unaware of it at that point. Furthermore, according to the facts, no personnel saw the crash. As no duty was broken, the restaurant is therefore not responsible.
Only communication that is legal and not deceptive qualifies as protected commercial speech. It is not, however, as well protected as other forms of expression. If the state can demonstrate the following, it may be regulated: (i) a significant public interest; (ii) the statute directly advances this interest; and (iii) the act is closely tailored to this goal (i.e., it is a ""reasonable fit""""). We refer to this as ""intermediate scrutiny.""
Since there is no evidence to the contrary, the speech in this instance seems to be both legal and truthful. There is a """"strong government interest"""" in preventing litter, and the law does advance that goal. It is not, though, specifically customized. Since 450 of the 500 flyers would still be up if only 50 of them were taken down, this does not really """"fit reasonably"""" with the stated ultimate purpose of reducing litter.
The claim that a pre-charge line-up is unlawful under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is one of the strongest justifications against it. The defendant has a strong case for the identification to be excluded under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause if a lineup is overly suggestive and increases the risk that the suspect will be mistakenly identified.
Should the court allow the motion for judgment as a matter of law in this case? Only when the court finds that the nonmoving party lacks sufficient evidence to adequately support its position is judgment as a matter of law appropriate. The jury in this instance could decide that the kick was accidental or that the victim impliedly agreed to be kicked. It might also conclude that the man did not agree and that the kick was deliberate. As a result, judgment as a matter of law is not appropriate because the nonmoving party is supported by enough evidence.
Parties may agree in their contract to forbid delegation or assignment. The contract's language must be carefully considered. When a contract just states that a party "cannot assign the contract," this is interpreted as only forbidding the delegation of duties. The contract would have to expressly forbid the assignment of rights in order to do so. A party may assign its rights if the contract expressly permits such a transfer; such an assignment is lawful. Therefore, the consent of the other party is not required. When a contract's rights have been delegated, the assignee may bring legal action against the original party if that party breaches its obligations.
"The difference between a servitude and a covenant is the remedy sought. If the plaintiff wants money damages, he will sue in equity under a theory of a breach of a real covenant. If the plaintiff wants something like an injunction that forces the other party to comply, he will sue in equity under a theory of an equitable servitude. In the event that the land is transferred, covenants and equitable servitudes may also be transferred. If the legal theory is a covenant, we require both vertical and horizontal privity, intent, notice, that the condition must touch and concern the land, and that it must all be present for the burden to run. We need all of these conditions, with the exception of horizontal privity, for the benefit of a covenant to operate. We just need intent, notice, and that the condition must touch and concern the land for an equitable servitude to run with the land. This is an equitable servitude situation since the daughter is asking for an order to compel the son to clean his pool. Since the son is a grantee of the property, we require intent, notice, as well as the touch and care factors, in order to hold the son to the commitment made between the man and the woman. The fact that there is a particular written phrase in the agreement that expressly states the intention for the promise to run gives us clear proof that there was intent. Additionally, because the commitment was included in the deed, we have notice. This is appropriate record notice. The need for good pool maintenance affects and is a worry for the land since it increases the pool's utility, usability, and value. As a result, the conditions are fully satisfied, and the equitable servitude will follow the land."
