This is a timed quiz. You will be given 60 seconds per question. Are you ready?
At common law, it was a burglary to break and enter the dwelling of another at nighttime with the intention of committing a felony therein. Here, all the elements were met. The breaking is accomplished by opening the closed door. Force or violence is not required to establish a breaking. The fact that she had authority during the day did not give her authority to enter at night so that it was still a breaking rather than an authorized entry. Stealing valuable jewelry would generally be a felony theft offense and thus the intent to commit a felony is proved under these facts.
The weight of authority is that a snatching does not qualify for the element of using force, violence or intimidation. When the thief snatches the property so quickly that the victim can offer no resistance this is considered to be insufficient force to support a robbery conviction. See People v. Patton, 389 N.E.2d 1174 (1979) (purse snatching; purse gone before victim realized what was happening).
This is embezzlement, which is the fraudulent conversion of property of another by one who is already in lawful possession of it. This is distinguished from larceny in that with larceny there is trespassory taking of the property of another with the intent to deprive the owner of it. There is no trespassory taking in embezzlement because the embezzler already had lawful authority over the money when the improper conversion of the money occurred.
One of the principles of the Eighth Amendment is that the punishment must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted. It is likely that the court would here follow the reasoning that it provided in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) where the Court found similar conduct to be “relatively minor” and not deserving of the “penultimate sentence.” The harsh treatment is more than others in the state and other states have received for more serious crimes and criminal records.
Generally, when the fear of being caught or some outside influence motivates abandonment, this will not be a defense. In this case, not only did she actually commit a completed attempted burglary by intruding into the space below with microscopic lenses, but she also then was motivated by fear of getting caught when she received additional information of the increased security in the bank. Furthermore, a defendant cannot abandon a completed attempt. See United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 410-11 (2d Cir. 2003) when a defendant has completed the crime of attempt; i.e., has the requisite intent and has taken a substantial step towards completion of the crime, the crime of attempt has already been committed. US v. Young, 613 F. 3d 735, 746 (8th Cir. 2010). In addition, abandonment does not work when the accused proceeded well into the execution and then turned away because the plans are found to have been frustrated. Boyles v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 473, 175 N.W.2d 277 (1970); see W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law 448 (1972). See also, Model Penal Code § 5.01(4).
An officer must have probable cause to believe that items in plain view are contraband before he may search or seize them. The police may not move objects to get a better view. In Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987), the officer was found to have acted unlawfully. While investigating a shooting, the officer moved, without probable cause, stereo equipment to record the serial numbers. The evidence was later suppressed because the officer had no probable cause to believe that the equipment, appearing in plain view, was contraband.
For involuntary manslaughter, there generally must be the killing of a human being in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection. The general rule is that involuntary manslaughter requires more than mere negligence in the civil sense. The negligence must be aggravated, culpable, gross, or reckless, that is, the conduct must be such a departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily prudent or careful man under the same circumstances as to show a disregard of human life or an indifference to consequences. This cannot be judged on the outcome but must be judged on the behavior. Criminal liability cannot be predicated on every careless act merely because its carelessness results in injury to another.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars any subsequent prosecution in which the government, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution, will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted. See Grady v. Corbin, 495 US 508 (1990); Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U. S. 682 (1977).
The facts state that he gave a “cogent” and logical statement confessing to the burglaries. There are no facts indicating that his disabilities got in the way of giving a voluntary confession. His prior experience weighs against his claims. Taking drugs is not a defense to a waiver of rights where the suspect appears to be lucid and appears to know what he’s doing. There is no evidence of police coercion, making his decision a voluntary one, under the totality of the circumstances.
This was not reasonable force under the circumstances. He could not reasonably be said to be in fear of serious bodily injury or death when he pulled the trigger. He could reasonably have ordered the minor out of the garage at gunpoint. When the boy started running he went toward the outside not toward the owner but in an opposite direction, thus giving owner no reason for excessive personal fear. Furthermore, the boy was unarmed and his manner of trying to exit did not give the owner any reason to fear a weapon.
That it is in his medical best interest is important factor and makes it easier to decide that the secondary effect of rendering him capable of standing trial was also valid. Furthermore, at present he is a danger to himself and others, and the medication may improve also that problem. In this case, all of the factors would militate in favor of granting the order.
The Supreme Court has ruled that where the defendant proves that he or she is ‘more likely than not’ incompetent to stand trial, the prosecution cannot go forward. This is called the preponderance of the evidence standard. To make him go to trial because he could not prove the more demanding standard of clear and convincing is a denial of due process. There are important reasons why an incompetent person should not be tried, such as his or her basic inability to communicate effectively with counsel may leave him or her virtually paralyzed in putting forth a defense. See Cooper v. Oklahoma 517 U.S. 348, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996) (clear and convincing test for incompetency is unconstitutional). The clear and convincing standard requires proof that it was “highly probable” that the fact has been proved. U.S. v. Boos, 329 F.3d 907 (7th Cir. 2003).
Assault is a wilful attempt or threat to inflict injury on another person, when coupled with the apparent ability to do so, and any intentional display of force as would give the victim reason to fear or expect immediate bodily harm. The intent may have been in a somewhat joking manner, but all of the circumstances here would have placed the woman in a state of fear. Waving a gun appears to the victim to be a threat, whether loaded or not, and is sufficient to have placed the woman in a state of fear.
Because first-degree murder requires proof of a premeditative kind of specific intent, it may be one of the easier offenses in which to negate the intent element by proof of voluntary intoxication. The intoxication in this case appears to have been severe enough to rob the defendant of his ability to premeditate and deliberate. This does not work as a defense if he already had the specific intent to murder his wife but was drinking just to get up the nerve. But there are no facts in this case to indicate that possibility.
An anonymous call with insufficient detail of the underlying circumstances did not establish probable cause. The taking of the dog to the front porch was an intrusion against the property interests of the owner. The home stands at the core of protection under the Fourth Amendment. The curtilage is part of the home itself. This was an illegal search of the curtilage of the home, making the warrant illegal also. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U. S. ____ (2013).
The receiving stolen property statutes were not intended to go after the thief of the goods. They are intended to punish the fence because the ready availability of the fence promotes theft. Thus, a thief who sells goods that he himself has stolen is not engaging in receiving and selling stolen property. See US v. Kimbrew, 406 F. 3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2005) (thief who sells the property that he stole is not eligible for sentencing enhancement of being “in the business of buying and selling stolen property); US v. McMinn, 103 F. 3d 216 (1st Cir. 1997) (statutes which criminalize "receiving" are generally not targeting the thief, but the wrongdoer who knowingly acquires the loot from or through the thief).
It is generally a matter of policy that the courts do not extend the vicarious liability of the felony murder rule to a case where an accomplice is killed. This is extending the scope of strict liability too far when the resulting death was the exact opposite of anything intended. Furthermore, in this case the actions of the robbers were not depraved enough - they did not start a gun battle; the only shot was by the guard. Also, the accomplice did not kill anyone and thus it is improper and stretching things to attribute murder vicariously to his co-conspirators. Certainly, they did not act as the agent of the bank guard. See Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 509 (Pa. 1958 ), which remains a leading authority on this issue. Shepardize Redline to get many more citations to this exception to the felony-murder rule. See also, Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 14.5(d) at pp. 456-58 (2nd ed.2003) (stating that "it is now generally accepted that there is no felony-murder liability when one of the felons is shot and killed by the victim, a police officer or a bystander") (footnotes omitted). Accord, Davis v. Fox, 735 SE 2d 259 (W. Va. 2012); Williams v. State, 818 A. 2d 906 (Del. 2002).
This is the most likely outcome. He was driving too fast for conditions, and not slowly enough for the slippery roads. By going 10 miles over the limit on a winding road in a steady rain, he killed someone while committing an unlawful but not felonious act, i.e., going too fast for conditions and the violation of speeding.
It is reasonably foreseeable that a fireman could be killed in the blaze. The homicide was thus a natural and probable consequence of the arson. If a thief had been caught in the fire and died, this would not be murder because it was not reasonably foreseeable.
The statute created a “status” crime because it did not require the specific proof of any antisocial conduct. It instead punished the illness of narcotics addiction. It made it a crime to suffer from an illness. See Robinson v. California, 370 US 660 (1962).
There must be reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to make a Terry stop. This is an objective standard, asking whether a reasonable police officer, faced with these circumstances, would believe that criminal activity was afoot. United States v. Patton, 705 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir.2013), (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). The inquiry looks at all of the factors, not just one or two. See US v. Williams, 731 F. 3d 678, 695-96 (7th Cir. 2013). The officer needs even more for a frisk; this requires an articulable suspicion that the subject is "armed and dangerous." Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009); United States v. Pedroza, 269 F.3d 821, 827 (2001), citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. The further inquiry is due to frisks being severe intrusions upon individual liberty. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. Here, there is high crime, gun violence, drug activities, very experienced officers, poor lighting, a 911 call, trying to avoid the officers, and a bulging in the jacket, along with wearing a jacket and jeans and being in the same area where the activity was reported, all of which together justify both the stop and the frisk.
The government must prove knowledge of illegality to get a conviction. It must prove that the defendant knew that his acquisition or possession of food stamps was in a manner unauthorized by statute or regulations. The government does not have to show that he had knowledge of specific food stamp regulations. The government does not have to prove the defendant’s personal state of mind. Rather, as in any other criminal prosecution requiring mens rea, the proof is found, if any, in the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. See Liparota v. United States, 471 US 419 (1985).
This is a crime against the individual, and not the state. In this kind of crime, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that it is unconstitutional to put a man to death when there was no taking of life.
These circumstances indicate that he voluntarily waived his right to remain silent. There is no evidence that he did not understand the rights given to him and that he read back out loud. There is no evidence of coercion – the mere questioning for over three hours is not coercion. The response to the question about God and forgiveness indicates a course of conduct evidencing a waiver of the right to remain silent. There is no requirement that police must get a written waiver prior to beginning interrogation. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010).
There was no agreement between them regarding the commission of a fraud. There must be an agreement to a common scheme or plan, which there was not here, therefore there is no conspiracy. See, for example, United States v. Rosenblatt, 554 F. 2d 36 (2d Cir. 1977)
Statements containing mere conclusions of criminal activity without a statement regarding independent facts and personal observations do not provide a sufficient basis for a neutral magistrate to decide to issue a search warrant. Here an anonymous letter makes conclusions but does not contain any statement showing that the information was acquired through the informant’s firsthand or personal knowledge. See People v. Gates, 423 NE 2d 887, 85 Ill.2d 376, 383-84, 423 N.E.2d 887 (IL Supreme Court 1981), discussing and citing to, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 US 108, 113, 114, 115 (1964). Although the affiant does not need personal knowledge, it must be alleged how the informant knew to say that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and the affiant should explain the underlying circumstances from which he concluded that the informant was "credible" or his information "reliable.” Aguilar v. Texas, at 114-15.
The officer’s failure to use less intrusive means to assure safety was unreasonable. The traffic hazard justified a minimal intrusion, and was alleviated when he turned the music down. She could reasonably order him out of the car in order to separate him from the gun, which was nonetheless a legal weapon under state law. But her conduct then escalated excessively out of proportion and initiated what was essentially an arrest procedure, which was not reasonably related in scope to the reason for the initial interference. See US v. King, 990 F. 2d 1552 (10th Circ. 1993); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1967); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (per curiam).
Although the husband’s heat-of-passion cooled down by the time he went to work, the statements at work by the adulterer himself triggered another heat of passion. A reasonable husband in the same circumstances would have been similarly triggered, so that this is voluntary manslaughter and not murder.
The Supreme Court has ruled that when both occupants are present and one of them consents but the other refuses consent, the refusal to permit entry prevails, rendering the warrantless search unreasonable and invalid as to him. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
Reasonable steps were available here to return the property to the owner. All she had to do was notify the restaurant that she was holding it and asking them to let him know if someone was looking for it. This was too easy under these circumstances to ignore – it just wasn’t that hard to find the owner in this case. The fact that she took it away and secreted it when he could have found the owner is evidence of criminal intent. The fact that, as a regular customer, she did not respond to the notice posted in the coffee shop makes it even more incriminating against her.
