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Prior restraint on expression carries a 'heavy presumption' against its constitutionality. Even suspected untruth or malicious intent would be insufficient to impose prior restraints. There are remedies after the offensive material is published. The essence of censorship is to have the state approve everything before it can be published. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Patterson v. Colorado,205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
It was a denial of her First Amendment rights to refuse her admission because she declined to answer questions about her beliefs and associations. This practice can have a chilling effect and cause law students to join only organizations that would be “safe.” Law students are thus encouraged to shun unpopular or controversial organizations. A person cannot be penalized for the organizations that she has joined. In Re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971); Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
The state does not have to provide for an exemption, but where it does so provide, it cannot discriminate. Permissive accommodation of religious beliefs requires neutrality to religions and religious beliefs, or else the state becomes entangled in favoring a religion or type of religion in violation of the First Amendment's prohibition against the establishment of religion.
A parade is a form of free speech. This use of the State's power violates the fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message. The government does not have the power to compel the speaker to alter the message by including one more acceptable to others. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc. - 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
The statute threatens the free expression of opinions by the newspaper. Newspapers might take the safe route and not comment to avoid controversy and the expense of printing a reply. The First Amendment protects the free discussion of governmental affairs, including of the candidates. Such regulation of the process is inconsistent with the guarantees of a free press. See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
The state has interests in teaching high school students how to conduct civil and effective public discourse and in avoiding disruption of educational school activities. In a high school setting, although political expression is generally not restricted, students do not have the same latitude given to adults. See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 US 675 (1986).
The Supreme Court has held that the public interest in having free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance—the core value of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment—is so great that the speech is protected unless such statements are shown to have been made either with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity, and there is no suggestion here of the comments being defamatory. See Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will County, 391 US 563 (1968). Additionally, the teacher was acting as a private citizen and not in the course of performing his duties, as distinguished by the Supreme Court's opnion in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). Thus, the teacher's speech was duly protected by the First Amendment.
Because the cards are free, the trouble of going to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, gathering required documents, and posing for a photograph is not a substantial burden on most voters' right to vote, and is not a significant increase over the usual burdens of voting. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008
The power to regulate interstate commerce includes the power to regulate the prices of the commodities that flow in commerce. The corn grown for home consumption could influence prices, both because it might creep into the market when prices rise, and even if never marketed, it supplies the need of the grower which would otherwise be met by his purchases in the open market. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
The government was unable to detail the compelling interest in barring religious usage of a tea, especially when applying strict scrutiny as the RFRA demands of such interferences. The argument that because it’s a controlled substance it is per se a compelling government interest is incorrect, because for example, there are exceptions granted to Native Americans (American Indians) for the religious use of peyote. See Gonzalez v UDV, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
Welfare benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement, and procedural due process is applicable to their termination. The recipient’s interest in receiving assistance, which provides her with essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care, coupled with the State's interest that her payments not be erroneously terminated, clearly outweighs the State's competing fiscal concerns. The stakes are too high to allow termination of aid without first giving the recipient a chance to know the case against her, to contest it and to produce evidence in rebuttal. See Goldberg v. Kelly - 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
See Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011), pertaining to a very similar state statute. The Court held that minors have a “significant measure” of First Amendment rights, including the right to view video games. In addition, the First Amendment’s protections don’t vary when a new and different medium for communication appears. Id. at 2733. Free speech about violence is not obscenity, and it is obscenity that the Constitution permits to be regulated. Id. at 2735. The statute here might make more sense if the state could prove a connection between violent video games and violence in minors, but it has not done so. The industry’s rating system does give protection to minors and parents. The state has not proved the compelling governmental interest and the statute does not pass strict scrutiny. Id. at 2737.
When a notice of a tax sale is returned as unclaimed, a State must take additional reasonable steps to attempt to provide notice to the owner prior to selling his property, if it is practicable to do so. In this case, a notice could have been posted on the front door, and the notice could have been sent also by regular mail. If the regular mail was not returned, that would indicate notice received. See Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006).
The program had a valid secular purpose of advancing education for poor children in the district. This was a neutral program that directs aid to a broad class of students and lets the individuals choose their preferences. The state does not participate after it distributes the money. This was a program of true private choice and therefore not an establishment of religion. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris - 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
The Supremacy clause (Article VI, clause 2) of the United States Constitution, declares the supremacy of federal laws over state laws that contradict them. The first state’s law did not contradict or frustrate the purpose of the federal law and was not preempted by it. There was no direct conflict between the federal and state statutes because it was possible to comply with both standards simultaneously. Furthermore, the federal law did not clearly set up an exclusive framework that excluded the genetic subject matter. There is a place for state consumer protection in a federal system. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
The Eleventh Amendment and the state sovereignty that it embodies are limited by the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which grants Congress authority to enforce "by appropriate legislation" the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which themselves are significant limitations on state authority. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
The Supreme Court has made some landmark decisions upholding equal protection and due process for persons regardless of sexual orientation. In U.S. v. Windsor, 570 U.S. ______ (2013), the Court held that provisions of the Defense of Marriage Act were unconstitutional under federal due process principles. In the instant case, it is a denial of equal protection to deny a person a seat on a jury panel due to nothing other than sexual orientation. See Smith-Kline Beecham v. Abbott (9th Cir., No. 11-17357) (2014).
The injunction must be granted – the school must accept the applicant. The idea of an alternative military school is similar to the discredited “separate but equal” argument. It is demonstrably unequal in that women do not have the same hard-core training, an equally accomplished faculty, or the prestige of graduating from the men’s institute. Parties who seek to defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for that action, which was not done here. There is no doubt that some women will be able to succeed and prosper in the demanding men’s institute. See United States v. Virginia, 518 US 515 (1996).
The ordinance makes it completely subjective as to what is prohibited. Laws must give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable chance to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Second, to stop arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, laws must provide explicit standards for enforcement. A vague law gives too much unbridled power to enforce the law indiscriminately, without defining parameters.
This hypothetical is modeled after Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 US 32, 41-42 (2000). A general-purpose roadblock for detecting narcotics violates the rule that searches and seizures be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. A search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U. S. 305, 308 (1997). The Edmond Court held that there were only limited exceptions to the general rule that a seizure must be accompanied by some measure of reasonable suspicion or probable cause against an individual motorist. The Court said it would not credit the "general interest in crime control" as justification for a regime of suspicionless stops. Because the primary purpose of these narcotics checkpoints was to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, and not to assure highway safety or for border patrol purposes, the program contravenes the Fourth Amendment. If the court did not draw the line at roadblocks designed primarily to serve the general interest in crime control, such intrusions would become a routine part of American life. 520 U.S. at 42.
A case might become moot if subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur. In this case that possibility of a resumption of illegal activities still existed. Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (1999).
The remedy was not unduly burdensome and was therefore 'congruent and proportional' to the harm intended to be remedied by the ADA. Congress had enough evidence to establish that the disabled were being denied fundamental rights that are protected by the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, among those rights being the right to access a court. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
Federal declaratory relief may be allowed when no state prosecution is pending and a federal plaintiff shows a genuine threat of enforcement of a disputed state criminal statute. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974). This is an actual controversy under Art. III of the Constitution; this is not imaginary or speculative, and petitioner need not expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to make his constitutional challenge.
Commercial advertising enjoys a degree of First Amendment protection. The ads conveyed information of potential interest and value to a diverse audience -- not only to readers interested in the services offered, but also to those with a general curiosity about, or genuine interest in, the subject matter or the law of another State, and to readers seeking change of the law in the state where the ad was published. Bigelow v. Virginia - 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
Simply having religious content or promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the Establishment Clause. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U. S. 677, 690 (2005) There is a sufficiently secular message of the Ten Commandments. They have undeniable historical meaning in the American heritage. A non-religious organization donated it for non-religious purposes, and it went unchallenged for 50 years. A reasonable observer, mindful of the history, purpose, and context, would not conclude that this passive monument conveyed the message that the State was seeking to endorse religion, even though it also had to be recognized that the Ten Commandments had religious significance. Id. at 545 U. S. 682-683. See also Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 845-846 (1995) (warning against the "risk [of] fostering a pervasive bias or hostility to religion, which could undermine the very neutrality the Establishment Clause requires").
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial. It applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial. Example: U.S. v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that private property shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.” Lingle v. Chevron USA Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536-37. When the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking for which reasonable compensation must be paid. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019, 1027 (1992).
Although strict scrutiny is an appropriate test, the preliminary question to answer is whether the the amendment consists of any rational purpose that furthers a legitimate government interest. If the amendment or statute does not further a legitimate government interest because it has no rational basis, then you don't need to go to next step and analyze it from the perspective of "strict scrutiny." The first test to apply is the rational basis inquiry: the law is so outrageous that it does NOT have a legitimate government interest. It is based solely on malicious animosity toward a class of people. This law was born of the bare desire to harm an unpopular group of people. This cannot constitute a legitimate government purpose. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
The constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws forbids punishment more severe than what was applicable when the criminal act occurred. Here it was retrospective and it made the criminal defendant’s punishment more onerous. The issue of being “vested” in good time right is irrelevant in an ex post facto analysis. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 US 24 (1981).
At some point a regulatory intrusion can result in a taking that requires compensation but that does not apply to a temporary moratorium on building. The key is that this was temporary and not permanent. It could go on for so long that it would become a taking but that must be looked at under the facts of each case.
