PhB Bachelor of Philosophy Bachelor of Philosophy: Knowledge and Skepticism 3

Question 1

What is the primary distinction between 'knowing that' (propositional knowledge) and 'knowing how' (procedural knowledge)?

Accepted Answer

Propositional knowledge involves facts; procedural knowledge involves abilities

Answer

Gilbert Ryle's distinction separates knowing facts ('knowing that Paris is in France') from knowing how to perform tasks ('knowing how to ride a bike').

Question 2

The 'regress problem' for foundationalism arises because:

Accepted Answer

Every justified belief seems to require further justification

Answer

If every belief requires justification from another belief, the chain must terminate somewhere, posing the problem of what justifies the foundational beliefs themselves.

Question 3

Alvin Plantinga's concept of 'proper function' in epistemology means that a belief has warrant when:

Accepted Answer

It is produced by faculties functioning as they were designed to function

Answer

Plantinga argues a belief has warrant (the quality that converts true belief into knowledge) when produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly according to their design plan.

Question 4

What is 'epistemic akrasia'?

Accepted Answer

Believing something against your own better epistemic judgment

Answer

Epistemic akrasia is believing P while simultaneously judging that you should not believe P, paralleling practical akrasia (acting against one's own better judgment).

Question 5

The 'underdetermination thesis' in philosophy of science implies skeptical consequences because:

Accepted Answer

Multiple incompatible theories can always fit the same evidence equally well

Answer

Underdetermination holds that evidence alone can never uniquely determine theory choice, implying we cannot have justified belief in one theory over its empirically equivalent rivals.

PhB Bachelor of Philosophy Practice Test

PhB Bachelor of Philosophy Practice Test

PhB Bachelor of Philosophy Bachelor of Philosophy: Knowledge and Skepticism 3