PhB Bachelor of Philosophy Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness 1 — Questions and Answers
Question 1: The 'hard problem of consciousness,' coined by David Chalmers, refers to the difficulty of explaining:
- How the brain processes sensory input
- Why we have subjective experience (qualia) at all (Correct answer)
- How memory is encoded neurologically
- The evolutionary origin of self-awareness
Correct answer: Why we have subjective experience (qualia) at all
Chalmers distinguishes 'easy' problems (cognitive functions) from the 'hard' problem of explaining why physical processes give rise to subjective, first-person experience.
Question 2: Substance dualism, associated with Descartes, holds that mind and body are:
- Different aspects of a single substance
- Two entirely distinct substances (Correct answer)
- Identical physical systems
- Emergent properties of the brain
Correct answer: Two entirely distinct substances
Cartesian dualism posits that the mind (res cogitans) and the body (res extensa) are fundamentally different kinds of substance that somehow interact.
Question 3: Which position holds that mental states are entirely identical to physical brain states?
- Property dualism
- Mind-body identity theory (Correct answer)
- Epiphenomenalism
- Idealism
Correct answer: Mind-body identity theory
The mind-brain identity theory (type physicalism) asserts that mental states are numerically identical to brain states, reducing psychology to neuroscience.
Question 4: Functionalism in philosophy of mind defines mental states by their:
- Physical substrate
- Causal/functional role relating inputs, outputs, and other mental states (Correct answer)
- Phenomenal qualities
- Genetic origins
Correct answer: Causal/functional role relating inputs, outputs, and other mental states
Functionalism holds that what makes something a mental state is its functional role—its causal relationships—not its physical makeup.
Question 5: Thomas Nagel's famous paper 'What Is It Like to Be a Bat?' argues that physicalist accounts of mind fail to capture:
- The evolutionary basis of consciousness
- The subjective, first-person character of experience (Correct answer)
- The neural correlates of perception
- The behavioral outputs of organisms
Correct answer: The subjective, first-person character of experience
Nagel argues that no objective physical description can capture what it is subjectively like to experience the world from a particular point of view.
Question 6: The philosophical zombie (p-zombie) thought experiment, used against physicalism, imagines a being that:
- Has consciousness but no physical body
- Is physically identical to a human but has no subjective experience (Correct answer)
- Behaves irrationally despite being physically normal
- Lacks memory but otherwise functions normally
Correct answer: Is physically identical to a human but has no subjective experience
If p-zombies are conceivable, Chalmers argues, then consciousness cannot be entailed by physical facts alone, challenging physicalism.
PhB Bachelor of Philosophy Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness 1
The 'hard problem of consciousness,' coined by David Chalmers, refers to the difficulty of explaining: