ACT Reading Practice Flashcards

The following passage is from a discussion of various ways that living creatures have been classified over the years. The world can be classified in different ways, depending on one's interests and principles of clas- sification. The classifications (also known as Line taxonomies) in turn determine which comparisons 5 seem natural or unnatural, which literal or analog- ical. For example, it has been common to classify living creatures into three distinct groups—plants, animals, and humans. According to this classifica- tion, human beings are not a special kind of 10 animal, nor animals a special kind of plant. Thus any comparisons between the three groups are strictly analogical. Reasoning from inheritance in garden peas to inheritance in fruit flies, and from these two species to inheritance in human beings, 15 is sheer poetic metaphor. Another mode of classifying living creatures is commonly attributed to Aristotle. Instead of treat- ing plants, animals, and humans as distinct groups, they are nested. All living creatures 20 possess a vegetative soul that enables them to grow and metabolize. Of these, some also have a sensory soul that enables them to sense their envi- ronments and move. One species also has a rational soul that is capable of true understanding. 25 Thus, human beings are a special sort of animal, and animals are a special sort of plant. Given this classification, reasoning from human beings to all other species with respect to the attributes of the vegetative soul is legitimate, reasoning from 30 human beings to other animals with respect to the attributes of the sensory soul is also legitimate, but reasoning from the rational characteristics of the human species to any other species is merely analogical. According to both classifications, the 35 human species is unique. In the first, it has a king- dom all to itself; in the second, it stands at the pinnacle of the taxonomic hierarchy. Homo sapiens is unique. All species are. But this sort of uniqueness is not enough for many 40 (probably most) people, philosophers included. For some reason, it is very important that the species to which we belong be uniquely unique. It is of utmost importance that the human species be insulated from all other species with respect to 45 how we explain certain qualities. Human beings clearly are capable of developing and learning languages. For some reason, it is very important that the waggle dance performed by bees * not count as a genuine language. I have never been 50 able to understand why. I happen to think that the waggle dance differs from human languages to such a degree that little is gained by terming them both "languages," but even if "language" is so defined that the waggle dance slips in, bees still 55 remain bees. It is equally important to some that no other species use tools. No matter how inge- nious other species get in the manipulation of objects in their environment, it is absolutely essential that nothing they do count as "tool use." 60 I, however, fail to see what difference it makes whether any of these devices such as probes and anvils, etc. are really tools. All the species involved remain distinct biological species no matter what decisions are made. Similar observa- 65 tions hold for rationality and anything a computer might do. According to the author, what is most responsible for influencing our perception of a comparison between species?

Answer: The organizational scheme imposed on the living world by researchers and philosophers

The first paragraph explicitly states, "The classifications (also known as taxonomies) in turn determine which comparisons seem natural or unnatural, which literal or analogical." The passage then illustrates this by showing how two different classification schemes (three distinct groups vs. Aristotle's nested souls) lead to different conclusions about the legitimacy of comparisons between species. Thus, the way we organize and categorize living things fundamentally shapes our perception of their similarities and differences.

The following passage is from a discussion of various ways that living creatures have been classified over the years. The world can be classified in different ways, depending on one's interests and principles of clas- sification. The classifications (also known as Line taxonomies) in turn determine which comparisons 5 seem natural or unnatural, which literal or analog- ical. For example, it has been common to classify living creatures into three distinct groups—plants, animals, and humans. According to this classifica- tion, human beings are not a special kind of 10 animal, nor animals a special kind of plant. Thus any comparisons between the three groups are strictly analogical. Reasoning from inheritance in garden peas to inheritance in fruit flies, and from these two species to inheritance in human beings, 15 is sheer poetic metaphor. Another mode of classifying living creatures is commonly attributed to Aristotle. Instead of treat- ing plants, animals, and humans as distinct groups, they are nested. All living creatures 20 possess a vegetative soul that enables them to grow and metabolize. Of these, some also have a sensory soul that enables them to sense their envi- ronments and move. One species also has a rational soul that is capable of true understanding. 25 Thus, human beings are a special sort of animal, and animals are a special sort of plant. Given this classification, reasoning from human beings to all other species with respect to the attributes of the vegetative soul is legitimate, reasoning from 30 human beings to other animals with respect to the attributes of the sensory soul is also legitimate, but reasoning from the rational characteristics of the human species to any other species is merely analogical. According to both classifications, the 35 human species is unique. In the first, it has a king- dom all to itself; in the second, it stands at the pinnacle of the taxonomic hierarchy. Homo sapiens is unique. All species are. But this sort of uniqueness is not enough for many 40 (probably most) people, philosophers included. For some reason, it is very important that the species to which we belong be uniquely unique. It is of utmost importance that the human species be insulated from all other species with respect to 45 how we explain certain qualities. Human beings clearly are capable of developing and learning languages. For some reason, it is very important that the waggle dance performed by bees * not count as a genuine language. I have never been 50 able to understand why. I happen to think that the waggle dance differs from human languages to such a degree that little is gained by terming them both "languages," but even if "language" is so defined that the waggle dance slips in, bees still 55 remain bees. It is equally important to some that no other species use tools. No matter how inge- nious other species get in the manipulation of objects in their environment, it is absolutely essential that nothing they do count as "tool use." 60 I, however, fail to see what difference it makes whether any of these devices such as probes and anvils, etc. are really tools. All the species involved remain distinct biological species no matter what decisions are made. Similar observa- 65 tions hold for rationality and anything a computer might do. Which of the following is NOT possible within an Aristotelian classification scheme?

Answer: A species having vegetative and rational souls while lacking a sensory soul

The Aristotelian classification scheme describes a nested hierarchy: all living creatures have a vegetative soul, some also have a sensory soul, and one species (humans) also has a rational soul. This means that possessing a rational soul necessarily includes having a sensory soul, which in turn includes having a vegetative soul. Therefore, it is impossible within this scheme for a species to possess a rational soul while lacking a sensory soul, as the sensory soul is a prerequisite for the rational soul.

The following passage is from a discussion of various ways that living creatures have been classified over the years. The world can be classified in different ways, depending on one's interests and principles of clas- sification. The classifications (also known as Line taxonomies) in turn determine which comparisons 5 seem natural or unnatural, which literal or analog- ical. For example, it has been common to classify living creatures into three distinct groups—plants, animals, and humans. According to this classifica- tion, human beings are not a special kind of 10 animal, nor animals a special kind of plant. Thus any comparisons between the three groups are strictly analogical. Reasoning from inheritance in garden peas to inheritance in fruit flies, and from these two species to inheritance in human beings, 15 is sheer poetic metaphor. Another mode of classifying living creatures is commonly attributed to Aristotle. Instead of treat- ing plants, animals, and humans as distinct groups, they are nested. All living creatures 20 possess a vegetative soul that enables them to grow and metabolize. Of these, some also have a sensory soul that enables them to sense their envi- ronments and move. One species also has a rational soul that is capable of true understanding. 25 Thus, human beings are a special sort of animal, and animals are a special sort of plant. Given this classification, reasoning from human beings to all other species with respect to the attributes of the vegetative soul is legitimate, reasoning from 30 human beings to other animals with respect to the attributes of the sensory soul is also legitimate, but reasoning from the rational characteristics of the human species to any other species is merely analogical. According to both classifications, the 35 human species is unique. In the first, it has a king- dom all to itself; in the second, it stands at the pinnacle of the taxonomic hierarchy. Homo sapiens is unique. All species are. But this sort of uniqueness is not enough for many 40 (probably most) people, philosophers included. For some reason, it is very important that the species to which we belong be uniquely unique. It is of utmost importance that the human species be insulated from all other species with respect to 45 how we explain certain qualities. Human beings clearly are capable of developing and learning languages. For some reason, it is very important that the waggle dance performed by bees * not count as a genuine language. I have never been 50 able to understand why. I happen to think that the waggle dance differs from human languages to such a degree that little is gained by terming them both "languages," but even if "language" is so defined that the waggle dance slips in, bees still 55 remain bees. It is equally important to some that no other species use tools. No matter how inge- nious other species get in the manipulation of objects in their environment, it is absolutely essential that nothing they do count as "tool use." 60 I, however, fail to see what difference it makes whether any of these devices such as probes and anvils, etc. are really tools. All the species involved remain distinct biological species no matter what decisions are made. Similar observa- 65 tions hold for rationality and anything a computer might do. Which of the following comparisons would be "legitimate" for all living organisms according to the Aristotelian scheme described in paragraph two? I. Comparisons based on the vegetative soul II. Comparisons based on the sensory soul III. Comparisons based on the rational soul

Answer: I only

According to the Aristotelian scheme described in paragraph two, "All living creatures possess a vegetative soul that enables them to grow and metabolize." This universal characteristic means that any comparison based on the vegetative soul would be legitimate for all living organisms. In contrast, sensory souls are only present in some creatures (animals and humans), and rational souls in only one species (humans), making comparisons based on these attributes legitimate only for specific subsets of living organisms.

The following passage is from a discussion of various ways that living creatures have been classified over the years. The world can be classified in different ways, depending on one's interests and principles of clas- sification. The classifications (also known as Line taxonomies) in turn determine which comparisons 5 seem natural or unnatural, which literal or analog- ical. For example, it has been common to classify living creatures into three distinct groups—plants, animals, and humans. According to this classifica- tion, human beings are not a special kind of 10 animal, nor animals a special kind of plant. Thus any comparisons between the three groups are strictly analogical. Reasoning from inheritance in garden peas to inheritance in fruit flies, and from these two species to inheritance in human beings, 15 is sheer poetic metaphor. Another mode of classifying living creatures is commonly attributed to Aristotle. Instead of treat- ing plants, animals, and humans as distinct groups, they are nested. All living creatures 20 possess a vegetative soul that enables them to grow and metabolize. Of these, some also have a sensory soul that enables them to sense their envi- ronments and move. One species also has a rational soul that is capable of true understanding. 25 Thus, human beings are a special sort of animal, and animals are a special sort of plant. Given this classification, reasoning from human beings to all other species with respect to the attributes of the vegetative soul is legitimate, reasoning from 30 human beings to other animals with respect to the attributes of the sensory soul is also legitimate, but reasoning from the rational characteristics of the human species to any other species is merely analogical. According to both classifications, the 35 human species is unique. In the first, it has a king- dom all to itself; in the second, it stands at the pinnacle of the taxonomic hierarchy. Homo sapiens is unique. All species are. But this sort of uniqueness is not enough for many 40 (probably most) people, philosophers included. For some reason, it is very important that the species to which we belong be uniquely unique. It is of utmost importance that the human species be insulated from all other species with respect to 45 how we explain certain qualities. Human beings clearly are capable of developing and learning languages. For some reason, it is very important that the waggle dance performed by bees * not count as a genuine language. I have never been 50 able to understand why. I happen to think that the waggle dance differs from human languages to such a degree that little is gained by terming them both "languages," but even if "language" is so defined that the waggle dance slips in, bees still 55 remain bees. It is equally important to some that no other species use tools. No matter how inge- nious other species get in the manipulation of objects in their environment, it is absolutely essential that nothing they do count as "tool use." 60 I, however, fail to see what difference it makes whether any of these devices such as probes and anvils, etc. are really tools. All the species involved remain distinct biological species no matter what decisions are made. Similar observa- 65 tions hold for rationality and anything a computer might do. If the author had wished to explain why "most" people (line 40) feel the way they do, the explanation would have probably focused on the

Answer: lack of objectivity in the classification of Homo sapiens

In the third paragraph, the author repeatedly questions the motivation behind people's insistence that human qualities like language and tool use be considered uniquely human and fundamentally different from similar behaviors in other species. Phrases like "I have never been able to understand why" and "I, however, fail to see what difference it makes" highlight the author's criticism of a subjective, human-centered bias in defining these traits, rather than an objective scientific assessment.

The following passage is from a discussion of various ways that living creatures have been classified over the years. The world can be classified in different ways, depending on one's interests and principles of clas- sification. The classifications (also known as Line taxonomies) in turn determine which comparisons 5 seem natural or unnatural, which literal or analog- ical. For example, it has been common to classify living creatures into three distinct groups—plants, animals, and humans. According to this classifica- tion, human beings are not a special kind of 10 animal, nor animals a special kind of plant. Thus any comparisons between the three groups are strictly analogical. Reasoning from inheritance in garden peas to inheritance in fruit flies, and from these two species to inheritance in human beings, 15 is sheer poetic metaphor. Another mode of classifying living creatures is commonly attributed to Aristotle. Instead of treat- ing plants, animals, and humans as distinct groups, they are nested. All living creatures 20 possess a vegetative soul that enables them to grow and metabolize. Of these, some also have a sensory soul that enables them to sense their envi- ronments and move. One species also has a rational soul that is capable of true understanding. 25 Thus, human beings are a special sort of animal, and animals are a special sort of plant. Given this classification, reasoning from human beings to all other species with respect to the attributes of the vegetative soul is legitimate, reasoning from 30 human beings to other animals with respect to the attributes of the sensory soul is also legitimate, but reasoning from the rational characteristics of the human species to any other species is merely analogical. According to both classifications, the 35 human species is unique. In the first, it has a king- dom all to itself; in the second, it stands at the pinnacle of the taxonomic hierarchy. Homo sapiens is unique. All species are. But this sort of uniqueness is not enough for many 40 (probably most) people, philosophers included. For some reason, it is very important that the species to which we belong be uniquely unique. It is of utmost importance that the human species be insulated from all other species with respect to 45 how we explain certain qualities. Human beings clearly are capable of developing and learning languages. For some reason, it is very important that the waggle dance performed by bees * not count as a genuine language. I have never been 50 able to understand why. I happen to think that the waggle dance differs from human languages to such a degree that little is gained by terming them both "languages," but even if "language" is so defined that the waggle dance slips in, bees still 55 remain bees. It is equally important to some that no other species use tools. No matter how inge- nious other species get in the manipulation of objects in their environment, it is absolutely essential that nothing they do count as "tool use." 60 I, however, fail to see what difference it makes whether any of these devices such as probes and anvils, etc. are really tools. All the species involved remain distinct biological species no matter what decisions are made. Similar observa- 65 tions hold for rationality and anything a computer might do. Which best summarizes the idea of "uniquely unique" (line 42)?

Answer: disapproval

The author introduces the phrase "uniquely unique" to describe the human desire to be set apart from all other species in a special, incomparable way. The author's subsequent statements, such as "I have never been able to understand why" and "I, however, fail to see what difference it makes," convey a clear sense of skepticism and criticism towards this anthropocentric viewpoint. This critical tone indicates the author's disapproval of the notion that humans must possess qualities entirely distinct from other life forms.

The following passage is from a discussion of various ways that living creatures have been classified over the years. The world can be classified in different ways, depending on one's interests and principles of clas- sification. The classifications (also known as Line taxonomies) in turn determine which comparisons 5 seem natural or unnatural, which literal or analog- ical. For example, it has been common to classify living creatures into three distinct groups—plants, animals, and humans. According to this classifica- tion, human beings are not a special kind of 10 animal, nor animals a special kind of plant. Thus any comparisons between the three groups are strictly analogical. Reasoning from inheritance in garden peas to inheritance in fruit flies, and from these two species to inheritance in human beings, 15 is sheer poetic metaphor. Another mode of classifying living creatures is commonly attributed to Aristotle. Instead of treat- ing plants, animals, and humans as distinct groups, they are nested. All living creatures 20 possess a vegetative soul that enables them to grow and metabolize. Of these, some also have a sensory soul that enables them to sense their envi- ronments and move. One species also has a rational soul that is capable of true understanding. 25 Thus, human beings are a special sort of animal, and animals are a special sort of plant. Given this classification, reasoning from human beings to all other species with respect to the attributes of the vegetative soul is legitimate, reasoning from 30 human beings to other animals with respect to the attributes of the sensory soul is also legitimate, but reasoning from the rational characteristics of the human species to any other species is merely analogical. According to both classifications, the 35 human species is unique. In the first, it has a king- dom all to itself; in the second, it stands at the pinnacle of the taxonomic hierarchy. Homo sapiens is unique. All species are. But this sort of uniqueness is not enough for many 40 (probably most) people, philosophers included. For some reason, it is very important that the species to which we belong be uniquely unique. It is of utmost importance that the human species be insulated from all other species with respect to 45 how we explain certain qualities. Human beings clearly are capable of developing and learning languages. For some reason, it is very important that the waggle dance performed by bees * not count as a genuine language. I have never been 50 able to understand why. I happen to think that the waggle dance differs from human languages to such a degree that little is gained by terming them both "languages," but even if "language" is so defined that the waggle dance slips in, bees still 55 remain bees. It is equally important to some that no other species use tools. No matter how inge- nious other species get in the manipulation of objects in their environment, it is absolutely essential that nothing they do count as "tool use." 60 I, however, fail to see what difference it makes whether any of these devices such as probes and anvils, etc. are really tools. All the species involved remain distinct biological species no matter what decisions are made. Similar observa- 65 tions hold for rationality and anything a computer might do. In the third paragraph, the author criticizes those who believe that

Answer: segregated from

The passage discusses the desire to keep human qualities distinct and separate from those of other species, specifically mentioning language and tool use. The author notes that some people insist that human language and tool use are not comparable to similar behaviors in animals, effectively creating a barrier. Therefore, "insulated from" in this context means to be separated or kept apart, which is best conveyed by "segregated from" in the sense of being categorized distinctly.