Criminal Law and Procedure Flashcards

During custodial interrogation, a suspect says 'I think I want a lawyer.' Officers continue questioning without providing counsel and obtain incriminating statements. Under Davis v. United States, the suspect's statement about a lawyer:

Answer: Was not sufficient because the right to counsel must be invoked unambiguously; ambiguous references do not obligate police to stop questioning

Under Davis v. United States, a suspect must unambiguously invoke the right to counsel; ambiguous or equivocal statements about wanting an attorney do not require police to cease questioning.

A defendant is convicted of simple drug possession. The state then charges him with possession with intent to distribute arising from the same seized drugs. Under the Blockburger test, the second prosecution:

Answer: Is not barred because possession with intent to distribute requires proof of intent to distribute, an element simple possession does not require

Under Blockburger, double jeopardy does not bar successive prosecutions when each offense requires proof of an element the other does not; intent to distribute is required by the second offense but not simple possession.

Officers apprehend a robbery suspect at the scene but find no gun on him. Without Miranda warnings, an officer asks 'Where is the gun?' to prevent bystanders from being harmed. The suspect reveals the gun's location. Under New York v. Quarles, this statement is:

Answer: Admissible under the public safety exception to Miranda because the question addressed an immediate threat to public safety

Under New York v. Quarles, the public safety exception permits officers to question a suspect in custody without Miranda warnings when necessary to address an immediate threat to public safety.

A defendant is acquitted of robbery based on the jury's finding that he was not present at the crime scene. The state then charges him with assault arising from the same event. Under Ashe v. Swenson, double jeopardy's collateral estoppel component:

Answer: Bars the second prosecution because the jury necessarily decided the defendant was not present at the scene of both crimes

Under Ashe v. Swenson, collateral estoppel is incorporated into the Double Jeopardy Clause and bars relitigation of ultimate facts necessarily decided in a prior acquittal.

A jury deliberates for six days without reaching a verdict and is dismissed over the defendant's objection. The prosecutor seeks to retry the defendant. Double jeopardy:

Answer: Does not bar retrial because a hung jury constitutes manifest necessity for a mistrial, permitting a new trial

A hung jury constitutes 'manifest necessity' for a mistrial, and retrial after such a mistrial does not violate double jeopardy even over the defendant's objection.

A corporate executive subpoenaed to produce company business records invokes her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to avoid production. Under Braswell v. United States, this claim will:

Answer: Fail because the Fifth Amendment's personal privilege does not extend to corporate records held in a representative capacity

Under Braswell v. United States, the Fifth Amendment's personal privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to corporate records; a records custodian must produce corporate documents even if personally incriminating.

A suspect invokes the right to counsel during custodial interrogation. Police stop questioning. Three days later, without providing counsel, police reinitiate interrogation and the suspect waives rights and confesses. Under Edwards v. Arizona, this waiver is:

Answer: Invalid because once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, police may not reinitiate interrogation until counsel has been provided or the suspect initiates communication

Under Edwards v. Arizona, once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, all police-initiated interrogation must cease until counsel has been made available or the suspect himself reopens communication.