PhD Doctor of Philosophy Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness 1 — Questions and Answers
Question 1: The mind-body problem concerns the relationship between mental states and:
- Physical brain states (Correct answer)
- Social norms
- Logical propositions
- Linguistic meanings
Correct answer: Physical brain states
The mind-body problem asks how subjective mental phenomena relate to the objective physical processes of the brain.
Question 2: Substance dualism, as defended by Descartes, holds that mind and body are:
- Two distinct and fundamentally different substances (Correct answer)
- Aspects of a single neutral substance
- Identical in nature
- Social constructs
Correct answer: Two distinct and fundamentally different substances
Cartesian substance dualism asserts that mind (res cogitans) and body (res extensa) are genuinely distinct substances that causally interact.
Question 3: Type identity theory, associated with Place and Smart, claims that mental state types are:
- Identical to brain state types (Correct answer)
- Functionally defined roles
- Irreducibly phenomenal
- Causally inert
Correct answer: Identical to brain state types
Type identity theory holds that every mental state type (e.g., pain) is identical to a specific type of neural state in the brain.
Question 4: Functionalism in the philosophy of mind defines mental states by their:
- Causal and functional roles (Correct answer)
- Intrinsic phenomenal qualities
- Physical substrate
- Linguistic expression
Correct answer: Causal and functional roles
Functionalism holds that what makes something a mental state is its functional role — its causal relations to inputs, outputs, and other mental states.
Question 5: David Chalmers' 'hard problem of consciousness' concerns explaining why physical processes give rise to:
- Subjective phenomenal experience (qualia) (Correct answer)
- Behavioral dispositions
- Intentional content
- Cognitive representations
Correct answer: Subjective phenomenal experience (qualia)
Chalmers distinguishes easy problems (explaining cognitive functions) from the hard problem of why there is something it is like to be conscious.
Question 6: Frank Jackson's Mary's Room thought experiment challenges physicalism by arguing that Mary gains new knowledge when she sees red for the first time, namely:
- What it is like to see red (Correct answer)
- The wavelength of red light
- The neural correlates of color vision
- The name of the color
Correct answer: What it is like to see red
Jackson's knowledge argument suggests that phenomenal consciousness involves facts not captured by physical descriptions.
The mind-body problem concerns the relationship between mental states and: