Simulator Exam Flashcards

A group of high school teenagers attended an all-night rave party at a local dance hall. The driver of the group purchased and took several ecstasy pills while there. When she attempted to drive home the next morning, she fell asleep and crashed into a tree, killing one passenger. She tested positive for ecstasy. The owner had rented the facility for the evening to a private group of college students. The owner kept its employees on the premises for security. The owner took numerous steps to prevent drug use, including searching attendees, confiscating drugs, and evicting drug dealers. The estate of the deceased teen sued the owner of the dance hall. The owner filed a motion to dismiss because it asserted no legal duty owed to the decedent. The plaintiff argued that the owner should not be allowed to use its facility for an all-night party, and that it was highly foreseeable that teen drivers and passengers would be put at risk. Will the court likely grant the motion to dismiss?

Answer: Yes, because the owner did not actively run the party and did not distribute drugs to the attendees.

A property owner generally owes a duty to keep their premises reasonably safe for invitees. However, when a facility is rented to a private group, the owner's duty may be limited, especially if they are not actively involved in running the event or promoting the dangerous activity. Here, the owner took reasonable steps to prevent drug use and did not actively participate in or promote the party, thus limiting their liability for the actions of the private group's attendees. The owner's efforts to prevent drug use further demonstrate a lack of direct culpability for the specific incident.

A motorist is making a left turn at a traffic light. When the light turns yellow he waits a second and decides to try and rush through the left turn. He is hit broadside by a car traveling through the intersection with the right of way. The investigating police officer points out the sign above the light that informs motorists to make a “left turn on signal only,” meaning that there was a left turn arrow that he was supposed to wait for prior to negotiating the turn. The officer gives him a ticket for “improper left turn.” The motorist pays the ticket. The other driver was severely injured and sues the motorist for negligence. The injured driver asserts in the complaint that the violation of the traffic ordinance is proof of “negligence per se.” Will the court instruct the jury that there was negligence per se?

Answer: Yes, because the ordinance that was violated was intended to avoid the precise harm that occurred.

Negligence per se applies when a defendant violates a statute or ordinance, and the plaintiff is a member of the class of persons the statute was designed to protect, and the injury is of the type the statute was designed to prevent. Here, the "left turn on signal only" ordinance is specifically intended to prevent collisions at intersections by regulating turns, which is precisely the harm that occurred when the motorist rushed the turn. Therefore, violating this ordinance is strong evidence of negligence.

A woman employed by a federally funded educational institution filed an employment discrimination and retaliation complaint under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, rather than under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The defendant moved for dismissal under Fed. Rule 12(b)(6). The plaintiff moved to amend her complaint. The court ignored the request for amendment and dismissed the case outright. Will that decision of the district court survive appeal?

Answer: No, the right to amend is to be granted liberally and must be given in this instance.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), courts should freely grant leave to amend pleadings when justice so requires. This liberal policy allows parties to correct errors or add claims, especially when no undue prejudice to the opposing party, bad faith, or futility of amendment is apparent. Dismissing the case outright without allowing an amendment to correct the statutory basis, particularly when requested, is generally an abuse of discretion.

A man was injured when his kitchen oven exploded due to a manufacturing defect. He filed a complaint against the oven manufacturer for personal injury damages. He also added a count for class certification and requested a recall of all similar ovens sold to consumers to stop the danger of physical injury. He created two putative classes: (1) everyone who purchased that model oven who lived in New York, the state where the man resided; and (2) everyone who purchased that model oven who resided in 25 other designated states where the company did business. The manufacturer filed a motion to dismiss the second putative class preliminarily under Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which allows for the early striking of any immaterial matter from the complaint. Will the federal district court judge likely grant the motion?

Answer: Yes, the court will grant it because the plaintiff is not a member of the second class that he set up.

For a class action to be certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the named plaintiff must be a member of the class they seek to represent. This requirement ensures the plaintiff's claims are typical of the class and that they can adequately represent the class's interests. Since the plaintiff resides in New York, he cannot represent a class of individuals residing in 25 *other* designated states, as he is not a member of that proposed class.

A group of college students published a monthly magazine with the purpose of challenging the laws of government and the values of society, and to thus stimulate creative thinking and expression. It criticized all religions, had drawings of public officials in sexual and corrupt activities, and mocked virtually all societal values. There was a flurry of frantic complaints to state legislators, who passed a law permanently enjoining the college from publishing the magazine without first getting the prior approval of designated state authorities for each new edition. The college brought an action to declare the law unconstitutional. Will the court strike down the statute?

Answer: Yes, because it’s an illegal prior restraint on free speech.

The law requiring prior approval from state authorities before publishing the magazine constitutes a prior restraint on speech. Prior restraints are administrative or judicial orders that forbid certain communications before they occur, and they are heavily disfavored under the First Amendment. Such restraints bear a strong presumption of unconstitutionality because they prevent speech from ever reaching the public, even if it might ultimately be found protected.

A state-funded military institute accepts only male students. The college-level school has a renowned history of producing military and government leaders. It is known for having a uniquely rigorous form of military training that builds strong character forged in the tribulations of adversity and military discipline. A woman with excellent scholastic and athletic achievements applied for admission and was turned down. She brought an injunctive action in federal court claiming a denial of equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The state offered to develop a parallel military school for women that would not be as physically demanding or as confrontational. Facilities and faculty would not be equal to the men’s institute because of initial budgetary restraints. In light of U.S. Supreme Court precedent, what should the federal district court rule?

Answer: There is a denial of equal protection because the “parallel” program does not provide the same rigorous military training or the full spectrum of benefits.

Under the Equal Protection Clause, gender-based classifications are subject to intermediate scrutiny, requiring an "exceedingly persuasive justification" and that the means are substantially related to important governmental objectives. The Supreme Court has held that separate educational facilities for men and women are unconstitutional if they do not offer truly equal opportunities and benefits. Here, the proposed parallel school for women, being less physically demanding and having unequal facilities and faculty, fails to provide the same rigorous training and full spectrum of benefits, thus denying equal protection.

A criminal defendant was charged with bank robbery. Prior to trial, he filed a motion in limine, asking the court to exclude from the trial evidence of his prior convictions for assault, forgery and involuntary manslaughter. The defendant wanted to testify on his own behalf but needed an advance ruling to determine whether his prior convictions would be allowed into evidence for purposes of impeaching his credibility. Under Rule 609(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, certain kinds of prior convictions are always admissible for impeachment purposes. Under Rule 609(a)(2), the following would be definitely admissible for impeachment purposes if the defendant takes the stand, without further analysis:

Answer: Only the forgery conviction would be per se admissible for impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a)(2).

Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2) states that evidence of a criminal conviction must be admitted for impeachment purposes if the crime required proving a dishonest act or false statement. Forgery inherently involves dishonesty or false statement. Assault and involuntary manslaughter, while serious crimes, do not necessarily involve an element of dishonesty or false statement as defined by this rule, making only the forgery conviction per se admissible under 609(a)(2).

A young man was arrested for statutory rape involving a fifteen-year-old girl. The girl had identified him as the person with whom she was having sexual relations. He asserted in his defense that the girl was sexually active and that she had intercourse with other men but not with him. He tried to offer into evidence testimony regarding the prior sexual activities of the girl and to identify other men with whom she had sexual encounters. Part of the defendant’s evidence would describe the girl’s need and desire to cover-up her other relationships, which gave her a motive to wrongly accuse the young man. Is the evidence admissible on the defendant’s behalf?

Answer: It is admissible to show that one or more others may have raped her instead of the defendant, and that she had a motive to want to blame the young man and to cover-up the other relationships.

While rape shield laws (like Federal Rule of Evidence 412) generally prohibit evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior, there are specific exceptions. Evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior is admissible if offered to prove that someone other than the defendant was the source of physical evidence, or if its exclusion would violate the defendant's constitutional rights, such as the right to present a defense by showing an alternative perpetrator or a motive for the victim to fabricate the accusation.

A building owner hired a painter to paint 20 office units that were vacant and being refurbished. They agreed to terms in writing, and the painter started on the work. After completing only two units, he received a written message from the owner repudiating their agreement and stating that his services were no longer needed. The painter ignored the message because he believed that his contract guaranteed him the full 20 units of work. He finished all units and sent a bill to the owner, who responded with a check for the first two units only. The painter sued the building owner for the full balance due. The building owner countered that he only owed up to the point that he repudiated the contract. Which of the following most closely states the probable decision of the court?

Answer: The painter had a duty to stop work and thus mitigate damages when he received a written repudiation of the contract.

Upon receiving a clear and unequivocal repudiation of the contract, the non-breaching party has a duty to stop performance and mitigate their damages. The painter, by continuing to work after the owner repudiated the agreement, failed to mitigate his damages. Therefore, he can only recover for the work completed up to the point of repudiation, as the law does not allow recovery for damages that could have been reasonably avoided.

An amateur golfer was playing in an amateur golf tournament. When she arrived at the ninth tee she found a new car with signs on it that said: "HOLE-IN-ONE Wins this 2014 luxury sedan.” The name of the a dealership appeared on the sign. Much to everyone’s amazement she inexplicably shot a hole-in-one. She attempted to claim her prize. The dealer refused, claiming that the car had been there from a charity tournament that was held two days earlier. The company admitted to neglecting to remove the car and posted no signs prior to the golfer’s hole-in-one. The golfer sued the dealership demanding delivery of the car. What is the likely decision of the court?

Answer: The golfer performed the act needed to win the prize, which in this case constituted an acceptance of the offer and the formation of an enforceable unilateral contract.

This scenario describes a unilateral contract, where an offer is made that can only be accepted by the performance of a specific act. The sign advertising the car for a hole-in-one constituted a clear offer, and the golfer's act of achieving a hole-in-one was the required performance for acceptance. Even if the dealer intended the offer for a prior event, it was publicly displayed without qualification, leading to a valid acceptance and the formation of an enforceable contract upon performance.

An owner leased land to a tenant who said that he was going to use the land for farming. The tract contained farmland and dozens of acres of pristine, scenic woodlands that were part of the view from the owner’s adjoining residence. The owner noticed that the tenant was cutting down trees and selling them to companies who manufactured wood and paper products. After a while, 20 acres or so had been cut down and the activity was continuing, leaving a ravaged sight on the land. Does the landlord have a right to stop the activity and recover the value of the lost trees?

Answer: This is voluntary waste to the property, which is prohibited by most leases; the tenant may be ordered to pay for the value of the waste, stop further activities, and is subject to being evicted.

A tenant has a duty not to commit waste, which means they cannot engage in acts that substantially diminish the value of the leased property. Cutting down dozens of acres of pristine woodlands for sale constitutes voluntary or affirmative waste, as it actively harms the property's value and character. The landlord can seek an injunction to stop the activity, recover damages for the lost trees, and potentially evict the tenant for breach of this duty.

An elderly man died with a will that had the following clause: “After payment of such debts and funeral expenses, I give and bequeath to my beloved wife the farm on which we now reside and all my personal property, so long as she remains my widow; the remainder on her remarriage or death to go to my son John..” Which one of the following estates in real property most closely reflects the wife’s interest upon her husband’s death?

Answer: It is a life estate that ends on her remarriage or death, with a remainder over to the son.

The clause "so long as she remains my widow" creates a determinable life estate for the wife. This means her interest in the property will automatically terminate upon the occurrence of either her death or her remarriage. The subsequent phrase "the remainder on her remarriage or death to go to my son John" clearly establishes a vested remainder interest in fee simple for John, which will become possessory upon the termination of the wife's life estate.

A seller of computers advertised for sale: “lot number 931, brand new computers, state-of-the-art, deeply discounted in price and with factory warranties.” Some of the buyers of these computers ran into problems in trying to register for the factory warranty. They were rejected without explanation, and several of them reported the problem to local authorities. The authorities eventually discovered that the whole lot of computers advertised by the seller was part of a truckload that was hijacked and emptied of its contents a few months earlier. Under questioning, the seller admitted to being part of a group that committed the hijacking. The police arrested him for theft, receiving stolen property, and criminal fraud. Can he likely be convicted of receiving stolen property?

Answer: No, one who steals the property from its owner cannot be convicted of receiving stolen goods when he tries to sell the stolen item.

Under the common law and in many jurisdictions, a person who actually steals property cannot also be convicted of receiving stolen property for the same items. The crimes of larceny (theft) and receiving stolen property are distinct; receiving stolen property requires that the goods were stolen by *another* person. Since the seller admitted to being part of the hijacking, he is the thief and cannot be convicted of receiving the property he himself stole.

A mother of four children age 3 to 9 left her children alone in their single-family home while she went to the store to get groceries. While she was still out, neighbors heard the children calling for their mother, and saw smoke coming from the windows. One neighbor pulled the three oldest children out of the house. The fire department arrived and a fireman found the fourth child dead inside. The fire was not intentionally started. The police found the mother and arrested her for involuntary manslaughter. Is her negligence sufficient to warrant conviction for involuntary manslaughter?

Answer: No, her negligence was stupid and near-sighted but not the kind of heightened awareness of probable danger that is required for involuntary manslaughter.

For a conviction of involuntary manslaughter based on negligence, the defendant's conduct must typically rise to the level of criminal negligence, which is a gross deviation from the standard of care that demonstrates a reckless disregard for human life. While leaving young children unsupervised is negligent and irresponsible, it may not meet the heightened "gross and reckless" standard required for criminal culpability in all jurisdictions, especially if there's no evidence of a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death.

Two teens were hired to assist the custodial staff at a high school over the summer as part of a summer youth program sponsored by the Board of Education. It was known that young children played and congregated on the outside school grounds over the summer. When their supervisors were on coffee break, the two teen assistants went into the unlocked chemistry lab where the confiscated magnesium and potassium nitrate, which they placed in sandwich baggies and hid outside the school in the bushes, where they intended to retrieve it later. An 8-year-old child came along and found the bags, and thinking them to be play dust, he played with the substances and with some matches he had found. The chemicals ignited and caused the boy severe burns over his hands, face and neck. His parents, on behalf of the boy, sued the school district for all proximately caused injuries, and a jury awarded damages to the boy. The school district appealed. Will the appellate court affirm the award based on negligence and negligent supervision of the teens?

Answer: Yes a duty was owed to the child, who was a foreseeable user of the land, and the chemical labs were supposed to be closed; thus, due care was not taken to prevent a foreseeable danger.

The school district owed a duty of care to the 8-year-old child, who was a foreseeable user of the school grounds during the summer. Knowing children congregated there, the school had a duty to secure dangerous items like chemicals, especially in an unlocked lab. The failure to secure the lab and adequately supervise the teens, leading to the chemicals being accessible, constitutes a breach of this duty, and the resulting injury was a foreseeable consequence.

A patient confided to his psychologist that he was having urges to kill his former girlfriend. The psychologist notated those urges in his office notes and called the referring customer, the security department of the patient’s employer, asking them to take care of warning the potential victim and taking any other necessary action. The security department did nothing. The patient continued to repeat the urges in therapy sessions but the psychologist felt assured that his notifying the employer was sufficient protective action. About 30 days after first sharing the homicidal urges, the patient shot and killed his former girlfriend in her parents’ home. The parents sued the psychologist and the security department of the employer for negligence. The psychologist filed a motion to dismiss, alleging no legal duty to the victim and, despite having no duty to her, that he took reasonable steps to warn and protect her. Will the court likely dismiss the case as a matter of law against the psychologist?

Answer: Yes, because he was absolved from further responsibility after he did take reasonable steps to have her warned.

Under the *Tarasoff* doctrine, a therapist has a duty to take reasonable steps to protect an identifiable victim when a patient expresses a serious threat of violence. However, this duty is generally discharged once the therapist takes reasonable protective action. In this case, notifying the patient's employer's security department, which was the referring party, could be considered a reasonable step to warn and protect the potential victim, thereby absolving the psychologist of further liability.

A land owner sued a purchaser of the land for breach of contract in not performing on their sales agreeement as of the last day set for closing. The defendant filed a counterclaim, alleging fraud by plaintiff in certain claims about the property, which greatly diminished the value, and requesting certain business loss damages, along with a refund of down payment funds. Six months later, the same defendant-purchaser of the land filed a complaint against the land owner, claiming fraud on two adjoing tracts of land that were allegedly negotiated around the same time as the origninal agreement between the parites. The purchaser included a promissory note to the complaint that allegedly superceded the original note listed in the first lawsuit and was signed a few days later. The purchaser's new, separate lawsuit claimed additional fraud damages against the land owner and return of additional funds being held by him. Can the second action by the purchaser be maintained or should it have been included with the counterclaim filed in the first case?

Answer: No, it cannot be maintained independently because it was a compulsory counterclaim that should have been raised as a counterclaim in the original lawsuit.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a), a counterclaim is compulsory if it arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the opposing party's claim and does not require adding another party over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. The purchaser's claims of fraud regarding adjoining tracts, negotiated around the same time and involving a superseding promissory note, are sufficiently related to the original land sale agreement to be considered part of the same transaction or occurrence. Therefore, these claims should have been raised as compulsory counterclaims in the first lawsuit, and cannot be maintained independently.

An online company has sued a competitor for trademark infringement in federal court. The company has made some broad discovery requests, which are being refused by the competitor. The Court issues a date for a scheduling conference. After the scheduling conference, which of the following appears to be the most appropriate subjects for a scheduling order, considering the mandates of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?

Answer: The Order will limit the time to join other parties, the time to amend the pleadings, the time to complete discovery, and the time to file motions. It will also set the limits of discovery, and set dates for pre-trial conferences and trial.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) mandates that a scheduling order must be issued after a scheduling conference. The primary purpose of this order is to establish a timeline for the litigation, including deadlines for joining other parties, amending pleadings, completing discovery, and filing motions. It also sets limits on the scope and duration of discovery and schedules important dates like pretrial conferences and the trial itself, ensuring efficient case management.

A high school student was running for president of the student council. He was a top scholar who had been selected to be the class valedictorian. Inexplicably, he gave a campaign speech at a school assembly that was filled with graphic stories and anecdotes about the imagined sexual adventures and prowess of certain teachers and students. Several teachers and students complained. The principal suspended him for five days and retracted the valedictorian honors. The student, with his parents, sued in federal court, seeking an injunction and damages based on denial of First Amendment free speech rights. The federal courts ruled for the student but the case came before the U.S. Supreme Court for final decision. Did the Supreme Court uphold the relief granted to the student?

Answer: No, the school exercised its appropriate function of trying to restrict the use of vulgarity and offensive discourse in a high school setting where free speech may be limited.

The Supreme Court, in *Bethel School District v. Fraser*, held that schools can prohibit student speech that is vulgar and offensive, even if it does not cause a substantial disruption. Schools have a legitimate interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate discourse and can regulate speech that undermines their educational mission. The student's speech, filled with graphic and imagined sexual adventures, falls within the category of speech that schools are permitted to restrict.

A criminal defendant was convicted of robbery and sentenced to ten years in prison, starting on Jan. 1, 2000. Sec. 204 of the state penal code provided for early release for good behavior, and under that provision he would have been granted supervised release as of Jan. 1, 2007. On Feb. 1, 2006, the state legislature repealed Sec. 204 and passed Sec. 205a. It reduced the good time credits for anyone convicted from that date onward, and also for anyone in prison as of the date of the section’s passage. The new release date was calculated to be Jan. 1, 2009. The criminal defendant brought a habeas corpus action arguing that Sec. 205a was an unenforceable ex post facto law as to him. The state courts turned him down saying that good time credit was a privilege and not a vested right. The case ultimately came before the U.S. Supreme Court. Did the Supreme Court invalidate Sec. 205a as an unconstitutional ex post facto law?

Answer: Yes, because it retrospectively increased the punishment over what was in effect when the offense was committed.

The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits states from passing laws that retroactively increase the punishment for a crime after it has been committed. By repealing the good time credit provision and reducing credits for existing prisoners, Section 205a effectively increased the defendant's sentence beyond what was in effect at the time of his offense. This retrospective application of a law that disadvantages a criminal defendant by extending their incarceration constitutes an unconstitutional ex post facto law.