LNAT Textual Interpretation 5 — Questions and Answers
Question 1: A criminal statute states: 'Whoever steals money or property of another shall be guilty.' A defendant obtains money by deception but without physically taking it. Is this 'stealing' under the statute?
- Yes, because the purpose is to protect property rights from dishonest acquisition
- No, because 'steals' in its plain sense requires a physical taking without consent (Correct answer)
- Yes, because fraud and theft are treated identically in all legal systems
- No, because the ejusdem generis rule limits 'property' to physical items
Correct answer: No, because 'steals' in its plain sense requires a physical taking without consent
Applying the literal rule, 'steals' typically denotes a physical taking; obtaining by deception may be a separate offense, not captured by the plain meaning of 'steal.'
Question 2: Which of the following best describes the difference between the mischief rule and the purposive approach to statutory interpretation?
- The mischief rule looks backward to the pre-statute common law problem; the purposive approach looks at the statute's overall aim (Correct answer)
- The mischief rule is used only in criminal cases; the purposive approach applies only in civil cases
- They are identical; mischief and purpose mean the same thing in legal interpretation
- The purposive approach looks at pre-statute law; the mischief rule looks at the statute's aim
Correct answer: The mischief rule looks backward to the pre-statute common law problem; the purposive approach looks at the statute's overall aim
The mischief rule (from Heydon's Case) focuses on the defect in prior law the statute remedied, while the purposive approach more broadly seeks the statute's overarching legislative purpose.
Question 3: An insurance policy covers losses 'caused by fire, flood, or other natural disasters.' A homeowner claims for losses caused by a landslide. Under ejusdem generis, is the claim covered?
- Yes, because 'natural disasters' is a broad catch-all term
- Yes, if a landslide is of the same genus as fire and flood—sudden, natural, catastrophic events (Correct answer)
- No, because fire and flood are man-made risks and landslide is natural
- No, because ejusdem generis excludes all items not explicitly listed
Correct answer: Yes, if a landslide is of the same genus as fire and flood—sudden, natural, catastrophic events
Ejusdem generis limits 'other natural disasters' to the same class as the listed events (fire, flood), and a landslide fits as a sudden, catastrophic natural occurrence.
Question 4: When courts interpret the word 'shall' in a statute, it is typically read as:
- Permissive, giving discretion to the duty holder
- Mandatory, imposing an obligatory duty (Correct answer)
- Advisory, suggesting but not requiring action
- Conditional, only operative if another provision is triggered
Correct answer: Mandatory, imposing an obligatory duty
In statutory drafting, 'shall' is a term of obligation and imposes a mandatory duty on the subject of the provision.
Question 5: A court is interpreting a provision that protects 'consumers.' A small business purchases goods for resale. Is it a 'consumer' under a statute designed to protect weaker parties in transactions?
- Yes, because all buyers of goods are consumers
- No, because a purposive reading of consumer protection legislation excludes commercial buyers making purchases for business use (Correct answer)
- Yes, because 'consumer' is defined by dictionary reference to anyone who uses goods
- No, because only natural persons can ever qualify as consumers
Correct answer: No, because a purposive reading of consumer protection legislation excludes commercial buyers making purchases for business use
Consumer protection statutes are purposively interpreted to protect individuals buying for personal use; commercial buyers are generally excluded from the protective scope.
Question 6: A long and detailed regulatory code ends with the phrase 'and any other similar conduct.' A defendant is charged under this catch-all. Which rule most strongly limits the scope of 'any other similar conduct'?
- The golden rule
- Ejusdem generis (Correct answer)
- The purposive rule
- The rule of lenity
Correct answer: Ejusdem generis
Ejusdem generis restricts the catch-all 'any other similar conduct' to the same genus as the specifically listed acts that precede it.
Question 7: An LNAT reading passage argues that strict textualism leads to better outcomes than purposivism because it constrains judicial discretion. Which of the following is the strongest counterargument?
- Purposivism is more popular with judges and therefore more legitimate
- Strict textualism can produce absurd or unjust results when language is imprecise or circumstances unforeseen by drafters (Correct answer)
- Textualism was invented after purposivism and is therefore more sophisticated
- Purposivism always produces fairer outcomes regardless of the statutory text
Correct answer: Strict textualism can produce absurd or unjust results when language is imprecise or circumstances unforeseen by drafters
The classic critique of strict textualism is that imprecise drafting or changed circumstances can make literal readings produce absurd results that frustrate legislative intent.
LNAT Textual Interpretation 5
A criminal statute states: 'Whoever steals money or property of another shall be guilty.' A defendant obtains money by deception but without physically taking it.
Is this 'stealing' under the statute?