Risk Management & Mitigation Flashcards
7 cards from real CARS practice questions. Tap to flip, then mark Knew It or Still Learning — missed cards come back until you master them.
Read the first 7 Risk Management & Mitigation flashcards as text
A passage argues that risk perception is shaped more by 'dread' (how catastrophic and uncontrollable a hazard feels) than by statistical probability. A policymaker uses this finding to justify stricter regulation of nuclear power than of automobile travel, even though car accidents cause more deaths annually. The strongest objection to this policy rationale is:
Answer: Basing policy on emotional responses rather than mortality statistics misallocates limited regulatory resources.
If policy follows perceived dread rather than actual harm magnitude, resources may be directed away from larger actual risks toward smaller but more feared ones.
An author describes 'risk compensation behavior,' in which safety interventions prompt individuals to take greater risks because they feel more protected. The author uses mandatory bicycle helmet laws as an example. Which of the following would most directly test whether risk compensation explains a reported decrease in cycling fatalities after helmet laws?
Answer: Measuring whether cyclists wearing helmets ride faster on average than those who do not.
If helmeted cyclists ride faster (a form of increased risk-taking), this would directly demonstrate the risk compensation mechanism at the behavioral level.
A passage in organizational theory argues that hierarchical decision-making slows risk response in fast-moving crises, while decentralized teams respond more rapidly but with less coordination. The author concludes that neither structure is universally superior. Which of the following scenarios would most challenge this conclusion?
Answer: Evidence that decentralized responses to a specific class of rapid crises consistently outperform hierarchical ones across diverse settings.
If one structure consistently outperforms the other across diverse settings for a type of crisis, the claim of equal situational superiority is undermined.
An ethicist argues that imposing quantitative risk thresholds on communities without their consent violates principles of autonomy even when the thresholds improve average safety outcomes. The core tension in this argument is between:
Answer: Efficiency and justice, specifically between aggregate welfare gains and individual consent.
The ethicist explicitly weighs a gain in aggregate safety (efficiency) against the violation of individual/community self-determination (justice), the classic efficiency-versus-rights tension.
A passage describes how corporate risk officers face pressure to underreport emerging risks to avoid alarming investors. The author concludes that market incentives systematically produce risk concealment. Which of the following, if true, would most weaken this conclusion?
Answer: Regulators require risk officers to certify disclosures under penalty of personal liability.
If personal legal liability attaches to risk officers for false certifications, the market incentive toward concealment is counterbalanced by a strong incentive toward accuracy.
An author claims that the most effective risk mitigation strategies combine redundancy (backup systems) with diversity (varied system types), citing aviation safety. A critic argues that diversity increases complexity and itself introduces new failure modes. This debate is fundamentally about:
Answer: The net effect of adding varied redundant systems when diversity-induced complexity may create new vulnerabilities.
The core dispute is whether the protective benefit of diverse redundancy outweighs the additional risk introduced by greater system complexity.
A passage states that regulatory agencies systematically underestimate low-probability, high-consequence risks because their institutional incentives reward short-term efficiency over long-term catastrophe prevention. The author's argument relies most heavily on which of the following assumptions?
Answer: Institutional incentive structures predictably shape the analytical priorities and outputs of agencies.
The entire causal chain from institutional design to systematic underestimation requires assuming that incentive structures reliably influence what regulators prioritize and how they assess evidence.