FREE TX Bar Criminal Law and Procedure Questions and Answers
The state charged the accused with the intentional murder of a former girlfriend. He admitted to killing her, but asserted that he lacked the intent to murder, due to his suffering from a personality disorder complicated by two days of drinking alcohol heavily.
The trial judge instructed the jury that "the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts." The judge did not tell them that they had a choice or could infer another conclusion; they were told only that the law presumed it. The accused was convicted of depraved heart murder and sentenced to 100 years in prison.
On appeal, the appellant argued that the court took the fact-finding task of determining criminal intent out of the jury’s hands by in effect ordering them to find intent. The jury could have felt that they were being told that they had no other choice. The state supreme court affirmed the conviction, but the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Will the Court likely reverse the conviction?
The key issue here is the jury instruction given by the trial judge. The instruction essentially told the jurors that "the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts." This kind of wording can be very problematic. Here's why: 1. Mandatory Presumption: This statement could be interpreted by the jurors as a mandatory presumption. That means they might think they had no choice but to find that the defendant had the intent to murder, rather than being allowed to consider all the evidence and make their own determination about his intent. 2. Burden of Proof: In criminal cases, the prosecution has the burden to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. By telling the jury that the law presumes intent, the judge effectively removes this burden from the prosecution for the element of intent. This conflicts with the fundamental principle that the accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. 3. Supreme Court Precedent: According to the precedent set in Sandstrom V . Montana, such instructions violate the Due Process Clause because they may lead the jury to believe they are required to find intent, thereby infringing on the defendant’s rights. In summary, the Court would likely reverse the conviction because the jury instruction could have been viewed as a direction that they must find intent, which interferes with the jury's role as the fact-finder and the defendant's constitutional rights to a fair trial.
A pet breeder is in the business of breeding calves at his cattle ranch where he has a stable of prolific cows who are very fertile. The newborn calves need constant attention and care.
One day one of the employees inadvertently leaves the fence door open and a newly-born calf breaks free and goes to his neighbor's land. The breeder went to the neighbor's land to retrieve the calf for its safety and to make sure it was unharmed.
However, he was arrested on a trespass charge after entering the land. The breeder appealed. Will the court dismiss the charge?
Under the legal principles outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, there is an exception that allows someone to enter another's land under certain privileges. Specifically, Restatement § 198 states that one is privileged to enter to retrieve chattel (personal property) to which they have the right of immediate possession, especially if it went onto the land without their consent. Additionally, Restatement § 197 explains that a person is privileged to enter or remain on another's land if it is or reasonably appears to be necessary to prevent serious harm to their property or cattle. In such cases, the person would be classified as a licensee rather than a trespasser. This means that the breeder had a justifiable reason to enter the neighbor's land to ensure the safety and well-being of his calf, which gives him a limited privilege to do so. His entry was necessary to prevent harm to his chattel, and this legal principle can sometimes apply in criminal cases to show that there was no criminal intent involved.
A criminal defendant went to trial and was convicted. After exhausting his appeals, he filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that he had been deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. He established that his counsel had not advised him of the benefits of plea bargaining, and had withheld several offers for guilty pleas from the government.
The offers expired for lack of a response. The sentence he received was at least seven to eight years more than if he had entered a guilty plea. Will the court likely decide that the defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel?
The court is likely to find that the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel, leading to a potential remedy such as a new trial or an opportunity to accept a plea deal that was previously offered.
The criminal accused was indicted and arrested by federal authorities on narcotics offenses and released on bail. While out on bail, and not represented by counsel, he met in a bar with an accomplice who had been charged in the drug conspiracy. The accomplice was wired and communicating the whole conversation to a detective sitting in a car down the street. The accused made incriminating statements.
At the trial, the detective who recorded the conversation was permitted to testify to the taped remarks of the accused and to other hearsay about the accused in the prosecution’s case-in-chief. The trial court and the state courts ruled that the detective's testimony was admissible evidence in the prosecution’s proof of the crime against the defendant.
Defendant appealed his conviction into the federal courts and the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. What is its probable ruling?
The U.S. Supreme Court is likely to reverse the conviction because the statements made by the defendant after indictment and without counsel should not have been used against him to prove guilt. This protects the integrity of the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.
A small town police officer pulled over a driver for speeding. He believed that the driver was acting irritable and fidgety, but he had no articulable reason to think anything was wrong. He searched the car anyway and found two cartons of freshly canned peaches, which were owned by the driver's neighbor and reported stolen off of her porch 24 hours earlier.
Authorities charged him with theft under the state criminal code. His motion to suppress the evidence because of an unlawful search was denied.
On appeal, will the appellate court likely reverse the lower court decision denying the motion to suppress?
The main issue revolves around the Fourth Amendment, which protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. For a search to be considered reasonable, law enforcement officers typically need probable cause. - Traffic Stops and Reasonable Suspicion: A traffic stop for speeding, similar to a Terry stop, requires only reasonable suspicion. This means the officer needs to have a reasonable belief that the driver has committed a traffic violation. - Search Requirements: However, the fact that an officer has grounds to stop a vehicle does not automatically give them the right to search it. Probable cause to search a vehicle must be independently established. This means the officer needs a reasonable basis to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime. - Probable Cause: In this situation, the officer had no articulable reason or evidence suggesting that there was anything illegal in the car. The driver’s behavior (being irritable and fidgety) alone does not meet the standard for probable cause. It could be due to a variety of innocent reasons, like nervousness from being pulled over. - Court Precedents: Various court cases, such as Rodriguez v. United States and Knowles v. Iowa, make it clear that without probable cause, a warrantless search of the vehicle is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the search was unconstitutional because the officer did not have probable cause to justify it.