Free MBE Questions And Answers — Questions and Answers
Question 1: A young woman signed up for a social media platform that allowed for networking with other businesspeople and organizations around the country. The woman found out that the site was selling her and thousands of other members' personal profile information to outside buyers so they could follow their online activities and purchasing patterns. She asserted two grounds of damages in the class action breach of contract lawsuit she filed against the service. She argued that the publication caused "embarrassment and humiliation" for her and the other members of the class, and that they should be reimbursed for the market worth of the data taken. Will the court likely find that these claims are sufficient to establish a claim of contract breach?
- No, because humiliation is not an item of damages in a breach of contract case, and the unauthorized collection of personal data does not establish an economic loss. (Correct answer)
- Yes, because the service breached the duty of good faith inherent in every contract.
- Yes, because these are common types of damages that are authorized in breach of contract cases.
- No, because Internet laws protect absolutely all communications and downloads of this nature as part of the service's guaranteed scope of free speech rights.
Correct answer: No, because humiliation is not an item of damages in a breach of contract case, and the unauthorized collection of personal data does not establish an economic loss.
Explanation: <br> In general, damages for mental or bodily anguish are not recoverable in cases of contract breach. LinkedIn Corp. v. Low, 900 F. Supp. (Dist. Court, <br> ND California, 2012) 2d 1010, 1028–29. Additionally, under breach of contract case law, the illegal collecting of a third party's personal information <br> is not regarded as a """"economic loss"""". See also In re JetBlue Airways Corp., Privacy Litig., 379 F.Supp.2d 299, 327 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (airline's <br> disclosure of passenger data to third party in violation of airline's privacy policy had no compensable value). In re DoubleClick, Inc., Privacy Litig., <br> 154 F.Supp.2d 497, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
Question 2: A young couple with poor credit was sold furniture by a furniture merchant. They agreed to a contract that stated they would not own the previous purchases until the new ones were fully paid for if they made new ones on the account. The agreement's back side has the clause written in small, difficult-to-read text. Except for one chair they bought a few weeks earlier, they had by that point paid for every item made on the account when husband lost his job. To reclaim all furniture that had ever been sold to the couple, the store filed a lawsuit. Will the couple's unconscionability defense be successful in defending them?
- Yes, because any time a seller puts terms in fine print it is proof of bad faith and unconscionability.
- Yes, because a combination of factors makes it likely that the court will recognize unconscionability under these circumstances. (Correct answer)
- No, because they might be able to find another store to sell them furniture, which proves that there was no lack of bargaining power.
- No, because the store was nice enough to extend credit, and the couple should be expected to pay for everything before they own any of it.
Correct answer: Yes, because a combination of factors makes it likely that the court will recognize unconscionability under these circumstances.
Explanation: <br> Solo v. Am. Ass'n of Univ. Women, 187 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1158 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (""An evaluation of unconscionability is highly dependent on <br> context. The doctrine often requires inquiry into the commercial se, small print, and oppressive situation favoring the party with all the bargaining <br> power"") (""Unconscionability will be found on a thorough examination of all factors that demonstrate a lack of bargaining power, unfair terms, <br> small print 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 812, 353 P.3d 741 (2015); Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 61 Cal.4th 899, 912. Unreasonably favorable terms for <br> the more powerful side are what constitute unconscionability. The most important question in every instance is whether the contract's terms are <br> sufficiently unfair, in light of all relevant facts, for a court to refuse to enforce them. Id. at 912. To assess whether the overall bargain was <br> unreasonably one-sided, the court considers both the agreement's substantive terms in their entirety as well as the circumstances surrounding <br> how it was formed. 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1146, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 269, and 311 P.3d 184 (2013); Shamoun & Norman, LLP v. Yarto International Group, <br> LP, 398 S.W.3d 272, 294 n.23; and Moreno v. Sonic - Calabasas A, Inc.
Question 3: A novice cyclist rode her brand-new bike for the first time. She entered the junction at a red light because she could not stop for it and fell off the bike there. She was severely injured while attempting to remount it when a car entering the intersection on a green light plowed over her. The car's driver was cited by the police for careless driving because he was using his cellphone while driving. The woman made a damage claim and claimed that the car's driver was irreparably negligent. According to her, a finding of negligence per se barred the driver from raising comparative negligence in accordance with a state law. Will the woman's request to block the man's attempted comparative negligence defense be granted by the trial court?
- Yes, because negligence per se is a final judgment of total negligence against the driver and it cannot be modified or rebutted.
- No, because the common law doctrine of negligence per se does not abrogate the defendant's right to apportion fault under the comparative negligence statute. (Correct answer)
- No, because she entered the intersection knowing it was a red light, thereby putting herself voluntarily and knowingly in danger, and she assumed the risk.
- Yes, because the driver had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, which abrogates the comparative negligence law.
Correct answer: No, because the common law doctrine of negligence per se does not abrogate the defendant's right to apportion fault under the comparative negligence statute.
Explanation: <br> The respective degrees of the plaintiff's and defendant's fault must be established in accordance with the comparative negligence statute in order <br> to determine if and how much compensation is appropriate. 770 P. 2d 1250, 1259 (Colo. Supreme Court 1989). Lyons v. Nasby. The common-law <br> notion of negligence per se should not be used to get rid of the legally mandated requirement that a jury determine how much carelessness the <br> plaintiff and defendant are each responsible for. 94 P. 3d 1271, 1273 (Colo. Ct of App, 1st Div. 2004). McCall v. Meyers. Will the trial court likely <br> allow the woman's move to bar the man's attempted comparative negligence defense? See Traphagan v. Mid-America Traffic Marking, 555 NW 2d <br> 778, 783 (Neb. Supreme Court 1996).
Question 4: As joint tenants with the right of survivorship, two cousins acquired ownership of real estate. The first cousin signed a judgment note and pledged his interest in the joint tenancy as security for a $20,000 loan. Later, it was declared a judgment against the first cousin's ownership stake in the property. A year later, the first cousin passed away. The mortgagee filed a lawsuit to stop the sale and to protect his interest in the property when the second cousin wanted to sell the property. According to the second cousin's defense, any lien on the first cousin's interest in the property was cancelled upon the first cousin's passing. Will the court enforce the mortgagee's lien against the second cousin's surviving sale of the property?
- No, because a joint tenant cannot legally file a judgment note on just that joint tenant's interest because it would be an unconstitutional interference with the other’s property rights.
- No, because when the first cousin died the second cousin became the sole owner due to the right of survivorship, as per the joint tenancy which was still fully intact. (Correct answer)
- Yes, because the second cousin's assent to the judgment lien was presumed by law and that assent destroyed the joint tenancy.
- Yes, because a mortgage or judgment lien against one joint tenant destroys the tenancy and destroys the right of survivorship.
Correct answer: No, because when the first cousin died the second cousin became the sole owner due to the right of survivorship, as per the joint tenancy which was still fully intact.
Explanation: <br> A judgment note or mortgage lien given by one joint tenant on his interest in the property does not dissolve the joint tenancy. The second cousin's <br> right of survivorship became effective upon the passing of the first cousin, making him the sole owner of the estate, in its entirety. Harms v. <br> Sprague, 105 Ill.2d 215, 222, 224-25, 473 NE 2d 930 (IL Supreme Ct 1984). Due to the legally established survivorship rights, the first cousin's interest <br> in the real estate expires upon his death. Id. at 224. A judgment does not confer title; rather, it just places a lien on that tenant's interest while he is <br> still living. The vast majority of courts adhere to this as the current standard today. A commercial lender would not competently loan money and <br> accept a lien signed by just one of two or more joint tenants, which is another important factor in contemporary practice. This lender would be <br> regarded as careless and run a serious danger of losing protection.
Question 5: When a homeowner buys a new leaf blower, he is so taken aback by its strength that he loses control and blasts a significant quantity of his work over the yard of the neighbor down the street. He blew vast quantities of plant debris from pest-infested plants and leaves into the neighbor's property. The debris has built up into big, ugly piles and harmed the neighbor's thriving plants. In addition to incurring costs to replace contaminated perennials, he must pay employees to remove the material. The neighbor files a trespassing lawsuit. The neighbor cannot establish that the homeowner intended to trespass or cause harm, therefore the homeowner files a petition to dismiss. Will the move to dismiss be granted by the court?
- No, because trespass is based on an intentional act of entering the land or sending something onto the land, and the actor does not have to intend harm to be liable for the tort. (Correct answer)
- Yes, because the homeowner had no practical way of controlling where the material went and he acted without malice or ill will.
- Yes, because the homeowner expected the wind to carry the debris away and did not think that it would accumulate on the neighbor's property.
- No, because the infected debris constituted an abnormally dangerous condition and homeowner could be held strictly liable for the trespass.
Correct answer: No, because trespass is based on an intentional act of entering the land or sending something onto the land, and the actor does not have to intend harm to be liable for the tort.
Explanation: <br> Trespass is an intentional tort, although there is no need to prove that there was a malicious or trespassing intent. All that is required is evidence of <br> intent to commit the act that results in the trespass. Trespassing does not require a defendant to personally enter the property; simply causing <br> something to enter the property is sufficient. So all that is required in this case is the intention to blow the leaves. See County of Harris v. Cypress <br> Forest Pub. 50 SW 3d 551, 554 (TX Ct of App. 2001). Utility Dist. Trespassing is considered an intentional tort because it entails the desire to do <br> anything that will infringe a property right or is almost guaranteed to do so, even though the perpetrator may not be aware that what they are <br> doing would violate that right. Id. Perry v. Cleveland Park Club, 165 A. (Dist of Col. Mun. Ct. of App. 1960) 2d 485, 488-89.
Question 6: For the safety of the general public, a regulation prohibits anyone with a drug arrest and conviction as well as those who are currently receiving treatment for drug abuse from working in certain state-run facilities. An action was filed by a department of treasury employee who claimed that losing his employment violated his rights to equal protection and due process. It is asserted that the ban is essential to safeguard the public from any potential issues. Which constitutional validity standard would most likely be used to evaluate this regulation?
- The rational basis test, because discrimination is generally favored with drug users or even those getting treatment.
- The rational basis test, because the regulation need only be related to a legitimate state interest to be valid. (Correct answer)
- Strict scrutiny, since drug users are a special class of persons often discriminated against by the public.
- Intermediate scrutiny, because, like gender, this can be a sensitive area where discrimination is common.
Correct answer: The rational basis test, because the regulation need only be related to a legitimate state interest to be valid.
Explanation: <br> Laws and statutes that do not directly affect a suspect class or obstruct a basic right are subject to the rational grounds test. Although the right to <br> work is basic, the right to work as a government or state employee at a certain location is not regarded as a fundamental right. Drug addicts would <br> not be accorded special treatment or be considered a protected class. See Wadsworth v. State (Supreme Ct of Montana, 1996), 275 Mont. 287, 301, <br> 911 P.2d 1165, 1173. 109 S.Ct. 656; Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, supra. Ct. 1384, 103 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1989).
Question 7: A store committed to buy the entire cherry crop from an orchard for a year. The delivery schedule was followed, and the contract stated that "Terms: Cash upon delivery — deliveries to be made at least twice per month." The orchard notified the store that a cargo of cherries was ready for pickup at the start of the fifth month. However, the truck driver neglected to bring the retailer's check with him. While handing over the cherries, the orchard gave the shop a three-day payment deadline. The check was mailed by the retailer, although it was two days late. No more cherries would be delivered by the orchard. The retailer filed a lawsuit against the orchard for breach of the installment contract and sought the price differential between the cherries' open-market value and what he would have paid under the terms of the agreement. The orchard moved to dismiss, arguing that the delayed payment reduced the contract's worth. Will the court grant the orchard's request to have the case dismissed?
- No, the delay in one payment under these facts was not enough to impair the value of the contract under the Uniform Commercial Code. (Correct answer)
- Yes, the agreement called for cash at delivery, which was not done when the driver forgot to deliver the check.
- Yes, the failure to make an installment on time was a breach because time is of the essence in all installment agreements.
- No, there is always a grace period of ten days for any single payment pertaining to an installment contract.
Correct answer: No, the delay in one payment under these facts was not enough to impair the value of the contract under the Uniform Commercial Code.
Explanation: <br> A non-breaching party to an installment contract may cancel the contract only when a breach or cumulative breaches substantially impair the value <br> of the entire contract, as stated in U.C.C. Section 2-612. To find a breach, the nonperformance would typically go beyond a small holdup in one <br> delivery of goods. Additionally, one payment would typically not be enough to prove a violation as time is typically not the substance of the <br> agreement. H & H Meat Products Co., Inc. v. Laredo Hides Co., Inc., 513 SW 2d 210, 216-217 (1974).
Free MBE Questions And Answers
A young woman signed up for a social media platform that allowed for networking with other businesspeople and organizations around the country.
The woman found out that the site was selling her and thousands of other members' personal profile information to outside buyers so they could follow their online activities and purchasing patterns.
She asserted two grounds of damages in the class action breach of contract lawsuit she filed against the service.
She argued that the publication caused "embarrassment and humiliation" for her and the other members of the class, and that they should be reimbursed for the market worth of the data taken.
Will the court likely find that these claims are sufficient to establish a claim of contract breach?