FREE MBE Questions And Answers
For the safety of the general public, a regulation prohibits anyone with a drug arrest and conviction as well as those who are currently receiving treatment for drug abuse from working in certain state-run facilities. An action was filed by a department of treasury employee who claimed that losing his employment violated his rights to equal protection and due process. It is asserted that the ban is essential to safeguard the public from any potential issues. Which constitutional validity standard would most likely be used to evaluate this regulation?
Explanation:
Laws and statutes that do not directly affect a suspect class or obstruct a basic right are subject to the rational grounds test. Although the right to
work is basic, the right to work as a government or state employee at a certain location is not regarded as a fundamental right. Drug addicts would
not be accorded special treatment or be considered a protected class. See Wadsworth v. State (Supreme Ct of Montana, 1996), 275 Mont. 287, 301,
911 P.2d 1165, 1173. 109 S.Ct. 656; Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, supra. Ct. 1384, 103 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1989).
A young woman signed up for a social media platform that allowed for networking with other businesspeople and organizations around the country. The woman found out that the site was selling her and thousands of other members' personal profile information to outside buyers so they could follow their online activities and purchasing patterns. She asserted two grounds of damages in the class action breach of contract lawsuit she filed against the service. She argued that the publication caused "embarrassment and humiliation" for her and the other members of the class, and that they should be reimbursed for the market worth of the data taken. Will the court likely find that these claims are sufficient to establish a claim of contract breach?
Explanation:
In general, damages for mental or bodily anguish are not recoverable in cases of contract breach. LinkedIn Corp. v. Low, 900 F. Supp. (Dist. Court,
ND California, 2012) 2d 1010, 1028–29. Additionally, under breach of contract case law, the illegal collecting of a third party's personal information
is not regarded as a """"economic loss"""". See also In re JetBlue Airways Corp., Privacy Litig., 379 F.Supp.2d 299, 327 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (airline's
disclosure of passenger data to third party in violation of airline's privacy policy had no compensable value). In re DoubleClick, Inc., Privacy Litig.,
154 F.Supp.2d 497, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
A store committed to buy the entire cherry crop from an orchard for a year. The delivery schedule was followed, and the contract stated that "Terms: Cash upon delivery — deliveries to be made at least twice per month." The orchard notified the store that a cargo of cherries was ready for pickup at the start of the fifth month. However, the truck driver neglected to bring the retailer's check with him. While handing over the cherries, the orchard gave the shop a three-day payment deadline. The check was mailed by the retailer, although it was two days late. No more cherries would be delivered by the orchard. The retailer filed a lawsuit against the orchard for breach of the installment contract and sought the price differential between the cherries' open-market value and what he would have paid under the terms of the agreement. The orchard moved to dismiss, arguing that the delayed payment reduced the contract's worth. Will the court grant the orchard's request to have the case dismissed?
Explanation:
A non-breaching party to an installment contract may cancel the contract only when a breach or cumulative breaches substantially impair the value
of the entire contract, as stated in U.C.C. Section 2-612. To find a breach, the nonperformance would typically go beyond a small holdup in one
delivery of goods. Additionally, one payment would typically not be enough to prove a violation as time is typically not the substance of the
agreement. H & H Meat Products Co., Inc. v. Laredo Hides Co., Inc., 513 SW 2d 210, 216-217 (1974).
When a homeowner buys a new leaf blower, he is so taken aback by its strength that he loses control and blasts a significant quantity of his work over the yard of the neighbor down the street. He blew vast quantities of plant debris from pest-infested plants and leaves into the neighbor's property. The debris has built up into big, ugly piles and harmed the neighbor's thriving plants. In addition to incurring costs to replace contaminated perennials, he must pay employees to remove the material. The neighbor files a trespassing lawsuit. The neighbor cannot establish that the homeowner intended to trespass or cause harm, therefore the homeowner files a petition to dismiss. Will the move to dismiss be granted by the court?
Explanation:
Trespass is an intentional tort, although there is no need to prove that there was a malicious or trespassing intent. All that is required is evidence of
intent to commit the act that results in the trespass. Trespassing does not require a defendant to personally enter the property; simply causing
something to enter the property is sufficient. So all that is required in this case is the intention to blow the leaves. See County of Harris v. Cypress
Forest Pub. 50 SW 3d 551, 554 (TX Ct of App. 2001). Utility Dist. Trespassing is considered an intentional tort because it entails the desire to do
anything that will infringe a property right or is almost guaranteed to do so, even though the perpetrator may not be aware that what they are
doing would violate that right. Id. Perry v. Cleveland Park Club, 165 A. (Dist of Col. Mun. Ct. of App. 1960) 2d 485, 488-89.
A young couple with poor credit was sold furniture by a furniture merchant. They agreed to a contract that stated they would not own the previous purchases until the new ones were fully paid for if they made new ones on the account. The agreement's back side has the clause written in small, difficult-to-read text. Except for one chair they bought a few weeks earlier, they had by that point paid for every item made on the account when husband lost his job. To reclaim all furniture that had ever been sold to the couple, the store filed a lawsuit. Will the couple's unconscionability defense be successful in defending them?
Explanation:
Solo v. Am. Ass'n of Univ. Women, 187 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1158 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (""An evaluation of unconscionability is highly dependent on
context. The doctrine often requires inquiry into the commercial se, small print, and oppressive situation favoring the party with all the bargaining
power"") (""Unconscionability will be found on a thorough examination of all factors that demonstrate a lack of bargaining power, unfair terms,
small print 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 812, 353 P.3d 741 (2015); Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 61 Cal.4th 899, 912. Unreasonably favorable terms for
the more powerful side are what constitute unconscionability. The most important question in every instance is whether the contract's terms are
sufficiently unfair, in light of all relevant facts, for a court to refuse to enforce them. Id. at 912. To assess whether the overall bargain was
unreasonably one-sided, the court considers both the agreement's substantive terms in their entirety as well as the circumstances surrounding
how it was formed. 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1146, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 269, and 311 P.3d 184 (2013); Shamoun & Norman, LLP v. Yarto International Group,
LP, 398 S.W.3d 272, 294 n.23; and Moreno v. Sonic - Calabasas A, Inc.
As joint tenants with the right of survivorship, two cousins acquired ownership of real estate. The first cousin signed a judgment note and pledged his interest in the joint tenancy as security for a $20,000 loan. Later, it was declared a judgment against the first cousin's ownership stake in the property. A year later, the first cousin passed away. The mortgagee filed a lawsuit to stop the sale and to protect his interest in the property when the second cousin wanted to sell the property. According to the second cousin's defense, any lien on the first cousin's interest in the property was cancelled upon the first cousin's passing. Will the court enforce the mortgagee's lien against the second cousin's surviving sale of the property?
Explanation:
A judgment note or mortgage lien given by one joint tenant on his interest in the property does not dissolve the joint tenancy. The second cousin's
right of survivorship became effective upon the passing of the first cousin, making him the sole owner of the estate, in its entirety. Harms v.
Sprague, 105 Ill.2d 215, 222, 224-25, 473 NE 2d 930 (IL Supreme Ct 1984). Due to the legally established survivorship rights, the first cousin's interest
in the real estate expires upon his death. Id. at 224. A judgment does not confer title; rather, it just places a lien on that tenant's interest while he is
still living. The vast majority of courts adhere to this as the current standard today. A commercial lender would not competently loan money and
accept a lien signed by just one of two or more joint tenants, which is another important factor in contemporary practice. This lender would be
regarded as careless and run a serious danger of losing protection.
A novice cyclist rode her brand-new bike for the first time. She entered the junction at a red light because she could not stop for it and fell off the bike there. She was severely injured while attempting to remount it when a car entering the intersection on a green light plowed over her. The car's driver was cited by the police for careless driving because he was using his cellphone while driving. The woman made a damage claim and claimed that the car's driver was irreparably negligent. According to her, a finding of negligence per se barred the driver from raising comparative negligence in accordance with a state law. Will the woman's request to block the man's attempted comparative negligence defense be granted by the trial court?
Explanation:
The respective degrees of the plaintiff's and defendant's fault must be established in accordance with the comparative negligence statute in order
to determine if and how much compensation is appropriate. 770 P. 2d 1250, 1259 (Colo. Supreme Court 1989). Lyons v. Nasby. The common-law
notion of negligence per se should not be used to get rid of the legally mandated requirement that a jury determine how much carelessness the
plaintiff and defendant are each responsible for. 94 P. 3d 1271, 1273 (Colo. Ct of App, 1st Div. 2004). McCall v. Meyers. Will the trial court likely
allow the woman's move to bar the man's attempted comparative negligence defense? See Traphagan v. Mid-America Traffic Marking, 555 NW 2d
778, 783 (Neb. Supreme Court 1996).